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DEAD HAND ARGUMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Adam M. Samaha*
This Article attempts to reset the relationship between theories of constitutional authority
and methods of constitutional interpretation. Several scholars assert that our reasons for
respecting the United States Constitution as law—despite its imperfection and dead
authors—strongly influence the proper method of interpretation for that text. The “why”
of authority supposedly drives the “how” of interpretation. But this relationship can be
better understood. To the extent an authority theory can be distinguished from
interpretive method, it is true that the former will identify what counts as law to be
interpreted. Beyond that, the asserted relationship fades. First, some authority theories
actually depend on a given interpretive method rather than the reverse, and an
overarching normative framework can independently suggest interpretive choices.
Second, and oddly, the correlation between a constitutional authority theory’s
persuasiveness and its logical implications for interpretation seems negative. Perhaps the
more persuasive, the less influential. This is so even putting aside institutional
considerations, which already have been used to soften the influence of high theory on
interpretation. Yet authority theories and interpretation may be connected in a different
way. The link involves multiple sources of law, instead of the interpretive method for
one text. An authority theory can gauge the relative strength of competing sources of law
bearing on the same decision, helping to resolve conflicts among them. Even the
Constitution is subject to an evaluation of its strength.
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For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the constitutional text is
itself incapable of and not in need of further demonstration.1
We can determine the method to interpret the Constitution only if we are first clear
about why the Constitution is authoritative.2
INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, the National Archives Building was refurbished at a cost of over
one hundred million dollars.3 Part of this investment went to preserve the “Charters of
Freedom”: original parchment versions of the United States Constitution, the Bill of
Rights, and the Declaration of Independence. Those documents were not always wellkept. The Declaration spent thirty-five years hanging on a wall of the Patent Office,
bathed with direct sunlight.4 By 1952, however, the parchments were placed in
ultraviolet-filtered encasements with helium and a little water vapor. Conservators in the
1990s detected deterioration of interior glass panes and possible helium leaks. So
engineers developed new encasements with gold-plated titanium frames, a humidified
argon gas filling, plus a system for imaging the documents and measuring their
atmosphere. The Charters now rest in these encasements. Every morning telescoping
robotic arms slide the parchments into the rotunda of the Archives for public viewing,
and every evening the documents are returned to bomb-proof vaults for safe keeping.5
This might seem extravagant. But the maintenance of cultural icons is a logical
preoccupation of government. Icons may perpetuate a sense of common mission that can
be useful in maintaining order and implementing policy.6 True, our understanding of
iconography is not always adequate to explain why any one bit of cultural material
becomes salient. Why not encase the Reconstruction Amendments, or Roosevelt’s Four
Freedoms, or Reagan’s Executive Order on cost/benefit analysis? In any event, the
practice of national symbolism is everywhere and persistent, extending to flags, colors,
statuary, pledges, anthems, oaths, and occasionally human remains.7 That the
Constitution has become an honored relic is not particularly strange.8
Somewhat more mysterious is the Constitution’s status as enforceable law. It is
not even the most popular document in the rotunda. This distinction belongs to the
1

Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 384 (1981) (emphasis omitted)
[hereinafter Monaghan, Perfect Constitution].
2
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1127, 1128
(1998).
3
See Lisa Rauschart, Founding Documents Resonate at Archives, Wash. Times, Sept. 11, 2003, at M14;
Linda Wheeler, 225 Years of History Going on Hiatus, Wash. Post, July 1, 2001, at C1.
4
See Verner Clapp, The Declaration of Independence: A Case Study in Preservation, 62 Special Libr. 503,
503 (1971).
5
See Ann Longmore-Etheridge, The Healthy Constitution of Document Security, Security Mgmt., Oct.
2003, at 26, 26.
6
See Sanford Levinson, The Tutelary State: “Censorship,” “Silencing,” and the “Practices of Cultural
Regulation,” in Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation 195, 197–99 (Robert C. Post
ed., 1998).
7
See Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence xiii (1997) (comparing
the Charters to Lenin’s embalmed corpse displayed in a Moscow mausoleum).
8
Cf. Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290, 1294, 1298 (1937) (noting the
role of symbol in “cementing internal order”).
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Declaration, which mainstream lawyers today consider rhetoric outside the scope of
positive law. In fact, the careful treatment of the Constitution at the National Archives is
a reminder about texts. Words, including positive law, do nothing without our assistance.
Declaring that “the Constitution requires” something of us is shorthand, false modesty, or
misdirection. Nor is it completely obvious, to many academics anyway, why we choose
to perpetuate the federal constitutional text as law.9
The question of the Constitution’s authority across generations rests within a
division of constitutional theory.10 The challenge is to answer the complaint that
following an ancient constitution amounts to dead generations governing the living. This
dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is feasible for the living to
depart from arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our generation participated
in little of the process responsible for the text; and that the Constitution is otherwise
imperfect for our time.11 Of course similar complaints can be lodged against all sorts of
arrangements that persist beyond one generation of decisionmakers, including dated
statutes, regulations, judicial precedent, wills, and perpetual trusts. It is hard to believe
that all of them are illegitimate. But perhaps the Constitution is distinctive. Key
provisions are exceptionally old, the text’s formal amendment process is difficult to
complete successfully under present conditions, and the text describes a government
system with nationwide and international impact. No other source of law shares this
combination of features, not even state or foreign constitutions.
However intriguing, dead hand arguments about the Constitution might be purely
academic. Our legal culture now firmly accepts the constitutional text as law without
indication of softening in the future. Government officials risk heavy reputational hits if
not job loss for publicly suggesting the text should be ignored—although predicting the
response to such suggestions is tricky because no one ever makes them. The best course
might be to recognize an impressive overlapping consensus, accept the Constitution’s

9

Cf. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
1737, 1749–50 (2007) [hereinafter Ackerman, Living Constitution] (arguing that document does not reflect
modern nationalistic values).
10
See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
16–17 (1962); Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 268 (1999) [hereinafter Waldron, Law and
Disagreeement]; Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013,
1045–46 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Discovering]; Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox
of Democracy, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 195 (Jon Elster & R. Slagstad eds., 1988); Joseph Raz,
On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in Constitutionalism:
Philosophical Foundations 152 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) [hereinafter Raz, Authority and Interpretation].
11
See infra Part I.B.2; Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 167–71 (1990) (rejecting such claims); John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 11 (1980) (raising such claims); Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 225 (1980) (pressing
such claims); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 381 (1997) (endorsing such claims;
see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1119, 1119–20
(1998); McConnell, supra note 2, at 1127 (“The first question any advocate of constitutionalism must
answer is why Americans of today should be bound by the decisions of people some 212 years ago.”);
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717, 1717,
1725, 1731–35 (2003) [hereinafter Strauss, Jefferson’s Principle]; David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 880 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law].
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authority as axiomatic, and move on.12
Against this possibility, several scholars have indicated a practical need to know
the rationale for the text’s status as enforceable law. They assert that theories of authority
are logically connected to methods of interpretation, and in a particular way: the former
drive the latter. One cannot decide whether to use some form of originalism or moral
inquiry or common-law reasoning or any other method of interpretation, the argument
goes, without knowing why the subject of interpretation counts as law. Thus Michael
McConnell asserts that “our answer to the ‘why’ question has implications for the ‘how’
question. We can determine the method to interpret the Constitution only if we are first
clear about why the Constitution is authoritative.”13 There are different versions of this
view but the basic idea is that an interpretive method ought to flow from a sound theory
of authority for the Constitution. If so, it is imperative to evaluate competing authority
theories despite any rock-solid overlapping consensus that the text must be law.
Constitutional interpretation is an ongoing necessity.
This authority/interpretation relationship has been asserted for both statutes and
constitutions, and there is something to it. Authority theories identify what counts as law
and so they generate targets for interpretation by decisionmakers. Furthermore, if an
official should respect a text just because a higher power issued it, then the official might
sensibly decide to resolve ambiguities consistent with the higher power’s ascertainable
intent, expectation, understanding, or interest. Consider James Madison’s logic. In 1824,
he preferred to consult the ratifying generation: “the guide in expounding the
Constitution” ought to be “the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified
by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.”14 But this type of
social contractarianism is not the only authority theory that has been connected to an
interpretive method. Scholars who believe our Constitution’s authority turns on its
adequately good content, or its coordination of human behavior, or even its potential to
destabilize political victories have asserted that these theories should strongly influence
interpretive method.15
In this Article, I test the assertion that authority drives interpretation. My claim is
that the relationship between authority theories and interpretive method has not been
adequately understood. General assertions that a theory of the Constitution’s authority
drives its interpretation are partly backward and importantly wrong.16 Crucially, I make
this claim while attempting to bracket issues of institutional choice and design, which
12

See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 23 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitutional
Law] (doing so after framing arguments); Monaghan, Perfect Constitution, supra note 1, at 383–84
(similar).
13
McConnell, supra note 2, at 1128.
14
Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 190,
191–92 (G. Hunt ed., 1910). Madison later suggested that subsequent practice of the legislature is crucial
to meaning. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison 183, 184–86 (J.B. Lippencott & Co., 1867).
15
See infra Part II.C (collecting sources).
16
I use “the Constitution” to refer only to text ratified per Articles VII and V. The relationship to precedent
is considered in Part II. I use “authority theory” as an umbrella for many arguments about legal status,
including but not limited to practical or theoretical authority as defined in philosophy. If a text qualifies as
a practical or theoretical authority, there might well be implications for interpretative method. On
philosophy’s use of these concepts, as well as “legitimacy” and “obligation,” see infra Part II.A.
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already have been used to question the usefulness of high theory.17 These issues are vital,
and I return to them in the closing pages. But my core argument will not depend on
theorists becoming empiricists, or the possibility that data or uncertainty about the
consequences of various interpretive choices will produce a peaceful overlapping
consensus. My argument tests the asserted relationship between authority and
interpretation on its own terms, setting aside orthogonal attacks based on institutional and
empirical factors.
The asserted relationship turns out to be problematic in two allied ways. First, the
supposed unidirectional influence of authority theories on interpretive method does not
always hold. Certain authority theories depend on an interpretive method rather than the
reverse. If a theorist wants to favorably assess a norm’s content before calling it “law,”
then she must approach a text containing the norm with some interpretive
presuppositions, however minimal. Moreover, an overarching normative framework can
independently influence both interpretive method and authority theory. If so, any
analytical sequence from authority to interpretation begins to fade.
Second and with respect to the Constitution, it is difficult to find any authority
theory that is both persuasive and logically connected to interpretive method. Indeed
there might be a negative correlation between a constitutional authority theory’s
persuasiveness and its practical implications for interpretation. This observation is based
on controversial assessments, but it can be illustrated with prominent theories. For
example, contractarian authority theories based on ratification might well point in an
originalist direction, if only these theories were now tenable for an ancient text. In
contrast, coordination theories provide plausible reasons to refer to the text today without
strongly influencing interpretive choices.
The implications are several. First, the best interpretive method likely varies over
time. Contractarian theories might suggest originalism at first and then lose force.
Second, other factors influencing interpretation have more power when authority theories
drop out. Still to be considered are decision costs and error costs, defined by a normative
theory and with regard to particular institutions. A third insight pushes in another
direction, however, toward the usefulness of legal theory: Authority theories might be
relevant to decisionmaking without instructing a decisionmaker how to interpret any
particular text. Decisionmakers might use authority theories to gauge the relative
strength of competing sources of law. If the Constitution is only weakly authoritative, we
might recognize other sources of supreme law—or instead level down all sources of law
toward what we now call “ordinary.” Regardless, the connection between authority
theories, interpretive methods, and sound decisionmaking ought to be reconsidered.
Part I explains the dead hand complaint in federal constitutional law, to which
theories of authority respond. It can be parsed into a descriptive claim about the ongoing
17

See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and
Public Policy 4–5, 246 (1994) (arguing that policy goals are virtually worthless without considering the
choice of implementing institutions); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 63–65, 254–59 (2006)
[hereinafter Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty]; Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 33–35 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Against
Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 2–4, 22 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be
Defended Empirically?, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636, 645–46 (1999).
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social construction of law and different types of normative objections. The discussion
includes an analysis of Article V as a potentially optimal outlet for constitutional change.
Part II elaborates the concept of an authority theory, tries to distinguish it from
interpretive method, and introduces the assertion that the former drives the latter. Part III
tests the connection between interpretation and various authority theories: (1) brute fact
theories that look to positivist dictates of legal culture; (2) good content theories that rely
on the excellence of the text or the Condorcet Jury Theorem; (3) contractarian theories
involving precommitment models and ex ante political incentives; (4) stability theories
relating to coordination, self-enforcement, and Burkean tradition; and (5) postmodern
unsettlement theory. Part IV collects lessons and speculates about why the asserted
relationship achieved a foothold in constitutional theory. Finally, a revised picture of
sound decisionmaking is suggested. It stresses additional factors: overarching normative
frameworks, pragmatic institutional considerations, and the relative strength of
competing sources of law.
In what follows, I assume that texts can be given meaning substantially bounded
by an interpretive method. Radical versions of the indeterminacy thesis are set aside,
positions that are hard to defend in any event.18 I also assume that a deductive
relationship from theory to method is possible. Perhaps these theories and methods must
be the product of induction or reflective equilibrium, but my argument will not depend on
this claim. Finally, I offer a caveat. An unbending commitment held by some will
prevent a decisive resolution of certain normative questions. Heroic national origin
stories are important to some audiences, for instance, and they are linked to authority
theories involving deference to the judgment of historical figures. My sense is that many
of these narratives are mostly myth, even if useful myth. But if others cannot agree, there
is a persisting need for the rest of us to know whether the asserted relationship to
interpretive method holds true for other authority theories. In any strong form, it does
not.
I. DEAD HAND ARGUMENTS
Skeptics might conclude that constitutional theory is a game you win by not
playing. The concern is that the theoretical arguments are often empty—designed to
produce favored outcomes in particular cases yet promoted as ecumenical solutions to
constitutional problems. This portrayal is probably too harsh; many scholars are working
in good faith, and attention to the concrete decisions of specific institutions is a perfectly
sensible preoccupation. But this Part suggests the reality is, in a sense, worse than the
cynical view. Constitutional debate may escalate from particular controversies, to
interpretive method, and then to theories of authority without speaking to live questions.
The problem is not that dead hand complaints against the Constitution’s authority are too
partisan or incoherent; a plausible dead hand complaint is restated below. The problem is
that the Constitution’s status as law might be, for the time being, beyond our control.
A. From Interpretation to Authority
A familiar disagreement proceeds along these lines:

18

See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 601, 621–22 (2006) [hereinafter Samaha, Undue
Process].
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The Supreme Court decides a case such as Roe v. Wade19 and observers are
divided. One camp of scholars is elated with the intervention, believing it comports with
a sound moral vision that is at least permitted by constitutional text. Ronald Dworkin’s
defense of abortion rights is illustrative. Affixing his position to the Constitution,
Dworkin contends that the document is not merely “a list of concrete, detailed remedies
drawn up by parsimonious draftsmen but a commitment to an abstract ideal of just
government.”20 Here he is not openly advocating judicial inquiry into justice unalloyed.
He is making a claim about the drafters’ semantic intentions. For certain constitutional
provisions, Dworkin argues that a proper interpretation of what the text means requires
readers to work out abstract moral principle as best we now can, and without regard to
the particular conceptions or expectations of the drafters’ generation.21 The text might
incorporate an abstract moral principle and, correctly understood, that principle might
yield an abortion right.
A second camp is distraught. They see the Court’s decision as a manipulation of
text and democracy-defeating—the exercise of excessive power by unelected judges who
have imposed their policy preferences on the nation. In this spirit Robert Bork declared
that “Roe, as the greatest example and symbol of the judicial usurpation of democratic
prerogatives in this century, should be overturned.”22 Bork denies that constitutional
adjudication ought to be an exercise in moral reasoning and demands that courts abide by
a version of originalism.23 This interpretive method, it is hoped, will constrain judicial
policy discretion while bolstering adherence to the Constitution as written and ratified.
Against the first camp’s commitment to moral outcomes, the second camp might
advertise a form of democracy with less judicial policy making and more fidelity to
constitutional text.
In response, some reject the idea that constitutional law ought to focus on
promoting “democratic” outcomes, at least when enforced by courts.24 They might think
private ordering is often too valuable to be sacrificed. But regardless, the originalist
camp is vulnerable to perceived contradiction: A commitment to democratic choice may
19

410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion 166 (1993); see also Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming,
Constitutional Interpretation:
The Basic Questions 155–56 (2007); Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government 40, 59–60 (2001) (“[W]e should interpret the Constitution’s ambiguous
moral and political concepts as requiring Americans to exercise their own best judgment.”); Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. (forthcoming 2007) (making an originalist
case for abortion rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by concentrating on high-level principle rather
than expected applications).
21
See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 120–23 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin, Justice]; cf. id. at 118, 122–
23 (acknowledging that considerations of fit in adjudication might contradict best interpretation of text).
22
Bork, supra note 11, at 116.
23
See id. at 144 (“All that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at
the time.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 92
(2004) (dividing original public meaning from original intent); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 34–37 (1999) (looking for evidence
of ratifiers’ specific, clause-by-clause intent).
24
See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 531, 571–
79 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, Accountability] (rejecting the primacy of majoritarian government); cf.
Dworkin, Justice, supra note 21, at 133–34 (conditioning democratic legitimacy on equal voice, equal
stake, and private sphere of ethical decisionmaking).
20
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clash with their brand of textual fidelity. That is, the originalist camp often justifies an
institutional choice away from the judiciary with a principle of democracy, yet their best
interpretation of constitutional text cannot invariably yield judicial abstinence.
Sometimes it will dictate aggressive judicial intervention against modern-day legislation
and executive preferences.25 This becomes apparent when attention moves from arguably
ahistorical abortion rights or gay rights and toward purportedly historical restraints on,
for example, Commerce Clause regulation or gun control. One fresh target is Parker v.
District of Columbia.26 There the D.C. Circuit used the Second Amendment’s text and a
founding era history of muskets and militias to tell the District it may not ban home
possession of functioning handguns in 2007.27
No consensus exists on which current practices are inconsistent with originalism. But
likely departures include much of the modern federal administrative state, most federal
criminal law, all public school desegregation mandates, and all federal constitutional
limits on sex discrimination by the state beyond voting rights. Originalists cannot take
contemporary democratic will as their polestar insofar as every version of originalism
chains outcomes to the decisions of past generations—whether “we” like it or not.
“Everyone who voted for the Constitution is long dead,” Richard Posner observes, “and
to be ruled by the dead hand of the past is not self-government in any clear sense.”28
Yet the dead hand is a complication for both camps. Nonoriginalists also try to
show respect for an ancient constitutional text. If honest, this respect will be
constraining; interpretive flexibility is not endless. The theorist who wants moral debate
to take place during litigation must accept constraints on that debate according to the
provisions of a morally imperfect Constitution. Originalists are no better off. They must
defend a version of democracy less presentist than advertised. Each camp may thus
tweak the other for its fealty to an aged constitutional text, and the alleged
countermajoritarian difficulty for the judiciary becomes an intertemporal difficulty for
everyone.29 The remarkable part is when either side suggests they have achieved an
advantage by asserting a dead hand problem.30
The issue persists beyond moral readings and originalism.

No reputable

25

See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 509, 515–23 (1996) (contrasting
originalism with conventional readings and Burkean conservatism).
26
478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, __ S.Ct. __ (2007) (No.
07-290). The case is pending before the Supreme Court as of this writing.
27
See id. at 384–95. The legislation itself was thirty years old. On the difficult interpretive questions, see
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637, 643–57 (1989).
28
Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 137–38 (1990); see also William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Education and the Bill of Rights, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 219, 224 (1964) (noting that “[T]he genius of our
Constitution resides not in any static meaning it may have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in its
applicability and adaptability to current needs and problems.”).
29
See Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 10, at 1045–46.
30
See Bork, supra note 11, at 170–71 (awkwardly endorsing a form of judicial originalism while claiming
that nonoriginalists with dead hand complaints want rule by judges rather than electorate); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 383, 392
(2007) (indicating dead hand is not problem for originalists because it is problem for text-bound
nonoriginalists). Ackerman’s rendition of constitutional politics, see 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations 6–7, 81–99, 263–69, 316–19 (1991), is actually similar; he counsels respect for non-Article V
higher lawmaking of the dead.
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interpretive method avoids the dead hand issue because no reputable method disregards
constitutional text. For example, thematic readings of the Constitution attempt to discern
a central message from the document as a whole. Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty is a
recent effort,31 but the tradition was vibrant by the 1980s with scholars pushing themes
such as deliberative democracy and individual liberty.32 Similar remarks apply to
Thayerian judicial deference to legislative judgment.33 Like thematic readings, which
must presuppose some interpretive tools to find a theme, deference is not a complete
interpretive method. Strategies are needed to ascertain when the Constitution is clear
enough for the judiciary to intervene and how other institutions are supposed to resolve
constitutional disputes. These questions remain related to an ancient text. Larry
Kramer’s version of popular constitutionalism, which promotes departmentalism for
constitutional issues and relies on founding era history,34 is not very different on this
score. A dead hand complaint can be softened to the extent that contemporary
understandings of the text are accorded weight and not cabined by inflexible interpretive
requirements. But the complaint cannot be ignored unless the text is no constraint on
popular meaning. A remaining interpretive school is more difficult to assess. Common
law constitutionalism is an evolutionary method focused on precedent and tradition. It
might be an alternative to text.35 But insofar as it incorporates respect for the
Constitution, the remarks above apply.
B. Dead Hand Complaints
In earlier ages, dead hand complaints could be taken more seriously than
debater’s points. American revolutionaries once spoke as if they could “begin the world
over again,”36 objecting to the perpetuation of bad practices or warning against attempts
to lock in one path for the future. They indicated a liberal democratic premise that living
human beings are the proper subject of moral concern. It was also suggested that there
was no choice but choice—that the dead could not possibly govern the living with
positive law. In fact the dead hand complaint in constitutional law is attributable to
positivism and democratic values. If the only possible authority were God’s will, or
immortal natural law, or the King’s fancy, or the everlasting German Nation, then law
could not be critiqued as a cross-generational artifact. But law and institutions are
human-made, the argument went, and they can be unmade once we see fit to reform in
31

See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 6 (2004) (setting out to
emphasize the Constitution’s supposedly “democratic objective”).
32
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 11, at 76–77 (focusing on judicial review and representation in politics); Cass
R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 123 (1996) (arguing from “the general commitment to deliberative
democracy”); Brown, Accountability, supra note 24, at 531–36 (suggesting government’s “final cause is
the protection of individual rights”); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748–49
(1999) (connecting multiple clauses of the Constitution to generate meaning).
33
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L.
Rev. 129, 136, 144 (1893); accord Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, supra note 17, at 254–55
(summarizing Thayer’s approach and present-day variations on it).
34
See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 246–53
(2004).
35
See infra Parts II.B & III.B.4.
36
Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), reprinted in The Thomas Paine Reader 65, 109 (Michael Foot &
Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987); see Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal
Democracy ch. 5 (1995) (reviewing Western intellectual history of intergenerational constitutionalism).
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light of new facts and values.
Thus Noah Webster lauded popular sovereignty and defended the absence of a
Bill of Rights in the 1787 Constitution. He argued that the “attempt to make perpetual
constitutions, is the assumption of a right to control the opinions of future generations;
and to legislate for those over whom we have as little authority as we have over a nation
in Asia.”37 Webster conceded that many laws might “always be good and conformable to
the sense of a nation,” but held that “most institutions in society, by reason of an
unceasing change of circumstances, either become altogether improper or require
amendment.”38 By 1789, Thomas Jefferson was equally emphatic. He argued to
Madison that, “by the law of nature, one generation is to another as one independent
nation to another.”39 Hence “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a
perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation.”40 The same sentiment
was expressed by Thomas Paine in his defense of the French Revolution. Paine argued
that past generations “have neither the right nor the power” to control their posterity.41
He derided Edmund Burke for “referring to musty records and mouldy parchments to
prove that the rights of the living are lost” as “[t]he circumstances of the world are
continually changing, and the opinions of men change also; and as Government is for the
living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it.”42
1. The Article V Outlet. — Still, there was no consensus on the proper balance
between stability and innovation during the founding period. Webster, Jefferson, and
Paine supported ratification of the 1787 Constitution with its Article V amendment
process, so a degree of formal entrenchment was acceptable to them on that occasion.
Furthermore, if the practice surrounding Article V amounts to the optimal method for
changing supreme constitutional law, then the dead hand complaint is eviscerated. Any
objection to this existing law would be appropriately handled through that process.
Article V’s optimality is, however, open to serious doubt. At a minimum we have
good reason to be uncertain about the matter, considering the difficult value choices and
empirical questions involved.43 Pressure to respect the Article V process is subject to at
least four rational objections: (1) it makes constitutional change too easy, (2) it makes
constitutional change too difficult, (3) it generates demand for covert or otherwise
troubling substitute methods of legal change, and (4) it skews the distribution of
amendment power in the wrong way.

37

Noah Webster, On Bills of Rights, 1 Am. Mag. 13, 14 (1787) (emphasis omitted).
Id. Webster later lost his commitment to popular will in favor of a Christian social order. See Richard
M. Rollins, Words as Social Control: Noah Webster and the Creation of the American Dictionary, 28 Am.
Q. 415, 416–19 (1976).
39
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 3,
8–9 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904) [hereinafter Jefferson to Madison].
40
Id.; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 12 The Works of
Thomas Jefferson 3, 11–14 (asserting that “the dead have no rights”) [hereinafter Jefferson to Kercheval].
41
Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man 12 (E.P. Dutton & Co., 1951) (1791) [hereinafter Paine, Rights of
Man].
42
Id. at 16–17; see also Jack Fruchtman, Jr., Thomas Paine: Apostle of Freedom 229–32 (1994)
(discussing the book’s reception in the United States).
43
There is also the issue of precisely what Article V should be read to require and permit. On judicial
treatment and past practice concerning Article V, see Tribe, Constitutional Law, supra note 12, § 1-19.
38
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The first concern might seem inconsistent with dead hand complaints about
entrenchment. But perhaps a past generation created an amendment process too lax for
present exigencies, one that bends to the excitement of reformers too easily, even if the
number of Article V victories seems small at first glance. Stability in formal
constitutional law has comforting benefits. An analogue to this concern is the suggestion
that today’s population ought to be shy about attempting Article V lawmaking.44 And
some foreign constitutions altogether exclude swaths of text from the formal amendment
process.45 Yet because the federal amendment rate is relatively low, Article V laxity is
almost certainly not the leading worry.46
The next two concerns are about stringency. The Article I, Section 7, process for
legislation is arguably elaborate but the formal amendment process is almost comically
complex. Article V requires supermajority votes in multiple institutions, and insulates
equal state suffrage in the Senate absent the consent of each affected state. Facing such
hurdles, advocates of legal change may seek substitute methods. They need not give up
on supreme constitutional law, either. Past generations accomplished serious change
without formally amending, expressly disavowing, or obviously following the text of the
Constitution.47 Thus Article V’s stringency is a potential explanation for creative judicial
“interpretation” of the text in a pinch,48 and an impetus for theories that validate sources
of supreme law not reflected in an Article V victory. This dynamic makes the formal
endurance of constitutional text less important—even misleading—for those who wish to
understand legal change and the actual character of our constitutional system. Of course,
equating a purported interpretation with a constitutional amendment requires a contested
choice for what qualifies as interpretation.49 And some observers might be pleased with
judicial power.50 The simple thought remains that our mixture of informal and formal

44

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, What’s Wrong with Constitutional Amendments?, in “Great and
Extraordinary Occasions”: Developing Guidelines for Constitutional Change 39, 39–42 (1999). But cf.
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, in The Least
Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 229, 242–56 (Richard W. Bauman
& Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (opposing generic aversion to using Article V).
45
See, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany) art. 79(3) (Bundestag trans., 2000) (exempting federalism and basic rights clauses from
amendment).
46
See William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and Amendability—A
Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1965, 1965–71 (2003) (questioning the net effect of
constitutional obduracy).
47
See 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 20–25 (1998) (describing non-Article V
constitutional moments); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 1457, 1458–64 (2001) (arguing that amendment has not been sufficient for change, either).
48
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (relying on the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause to oppose racial segregation in D.C. public schools); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
124–25 (1942) (testing federal regulation by the purportedly substantial effect of its subject on interstate
commerce); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 529–47, 553–54 (1871) (emphasizing exigency in
upholding new paper currency).
49
See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended?, in
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 13, 25–36 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995).
50
Cf. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1958–
60, 1968 (2003) (valuing judicial independence); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
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updating of constitutional law and text is subject to fair objection.
The fourth concern works somewhat independently. It raises questions about the
distribution of power to amend. Even if the rate of federal constitutional amendment is
perfectly acceptable, there is the charge that Article V is problematically skewed toward
states as entities. Small population states are likely to have more power in the Article V
amendment process compared to, say, a national plebiscite or ordinary federal statute
making. Some believe that Article V has become discordant with a nationalizing culture
and that the Constitution will not include key contemporary values.51 The most
entrenched textual norm is equal representation in the Senate for every state, but no one
appears to believe this provision is the most central moral value in our law. A related
critique involves congressional power and self-dealing. One might think that members of
Congress, rather than the states, possess too much leverage over institutional reform that
affects them.52 Perhaps some type of citizen initiative process, for all the hazards, would
be an improvement.53
There always have been alternative models for constitutional change. Jefferson
himself vetted several: a flat sunset provision for any law after its nineteenth birthday,54
putting an expiring constitution to a majority popular vote,55 or constitutional conventions
whenever two of three branches of government by two-thirds votes support textual
alterations.56 And Paine intimated that constitutions might be no more entrenched than
statutes. He acknowledged that a law may properly extend across generations if the
current generation retains power to repeal, and for him “the non-repealing passes for
consent.”57
Indeed, history reveals little or no support for Article V as a model. The voting
rules for amendment of written constitutions in our states and in foreign nations tend to
be less demanding than Article V. In addition, the frequency of amendment in these
jurisdictions seems higher, even though such victories are less resilient and thus arguably
less valuable.58 More dramatically, fourteen states have implemented one of Jefferson’s
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 144, 174–76 (1996) (worrying
about majoritarian threats).
51
See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 9, at 1749–50.
52
See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the
Constitutional Amending Process, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 111, 116 (1993) (worrying about efficient policy
outcomes in Congress).
53
See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 18, § 3; Or. Const. art. IV, § 2.
54
See Jefferson to Madison, supra note 39, at 6; cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (setting localized sunset); id.
art. V (same); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (addressing initial state representation in the House); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2
(addressing initial classification of senators).
55
See Jefferson to Kercheval, supra note 40, at 12–14.
56
See Thomas Jefferson, Draught of a Fundamental Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia
(1783), in Notes on the State of Virginia 225, 236 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1853).
57
Paine, Rights of Man, supra note 41, at 15; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Earle (Sept.
24, 1823), in 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 470, 471 (Andrew Lipscomb & Albert Bergh eds.,
1905) (noting convenience of “implied assent”).
58
See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Responding to Imperfection,
supra note 49, at 236, 247–49 & tbl.1; Janice C. May, Amending State Constitutions 1996–97, 30 Rutgers
L.J. 1025, 1025 & n.6 (1999) (recounting frequency and success of state amendment proposals); Janice C.
May, State Constitutional Developments in 2003, in 36 The Book of the States 3, 6 tbl.B (2004)
[hereinafter May, Developments]; Bjørn E. Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and
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ideas for systematic instability. In these places the question whether to hold a new state
constitutional convention must be on the ballot periodically, such as every twenty years.59
Between 1970 and 2000, this question was posed twenty-six times and on four occasions
enough voters answered in the affirmative.60 Lenient amendment procedures are not
disastrous, although surely some jurisdictions would be better off with greater formal
legal stability.
There are more imaginative alternatives as well. The Constitution might have
sunsetted Article V and converted the remainder to an ordinary statute after twenty years.
Or it might have established, in lieu of voting rules, a standard for departing from the
text’s meaning. We might have asked whether fidelity to the text would be seriously
contrary to our present sense of public policy (which is basically how wills and perpetual
trusts are checked61), or whether directives in the text are now unworkable and the
subject of little reliance (as courts may do under the doctrine of stare decisis62). In fact
these standards might roughly track the reality of informal change to our nominally
supreme constitutional text.
None of this demonstrates intolerable flaws in the current system. The issue is
clouded with normative and empirical disputes. For example, relatively high textual
amendment rates might be appropriate for the states yet riskier at the national level; or an
often-amended text might be associated with more numerous and dangerous full-scale
revisions.63 As well, credible commitments to particular legal forms have liberating
upsides, which I return to below, while the hoped-for clarity of amendment voting rules
might beat amendment standards. Or it could be that formal rules for amendment are
much less important for amendment rates than the degree of partisan competition.64 Plus
different people have different tolerance levels for judicial updating, to the extent it acts
as a substitute for the formal amendment process. But to say there is controversy and
uncertainty is not to endorse today’s settlement, either.
Constitutional Stability, in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence
319, 333–35 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006) (discussing relationship between
stringency and amendment rates).
59
See, e.g., Ill. Const. art. 14, § 1(b); May, Developments, supra note 58, at 4.
60
Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question Referendum: The New York
Experience in National Context, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 1017, 1044 tbl. I (2002). Each success was in a relatively
small state: Hawaii, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire (twice).
61
See Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 211–17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to enforce
testator’s wish that her mansion be destroyed, considering neighbors’ property values); Restatement (Third)
of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 cmt. c (1999) (presenting nonexhaustive list of
invalid conditions in wills); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29(c) & cmts. f & i (2006) (calling for
balancing trusts’ benefits with “the effects of deadhand control”).
62
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)).
63
See Lutz, supra note 58, at 247–52.
64
See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions,
7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 62, 64, 74–75 (2005) (downplaying the role of formal amendment rules after
accounting for influence of partisan political competition, and claiming that civil law origins are related to
higher state constitutional amendment rates); see also Lutz, supra note 58, at 247 (suggesting that high
amendment rates are partly a product of longer constitutional documents covering more territory). On
some of the methodological choices involved in studying the relationship between formal amendment rules
and amendment rates, see Astrid Lorenz, How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two
Alternatives, 17 J. Theoretical Politics 339 (2005).
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2. Content of the Complaint. — If thoughts of Article V optimality can be
defeated with serious doubts or uncertainty, then a dead hand complaint has life. We can
aggregate such complaints into a generic restatement that combines descriptive and
normative claims: (1) the arrangement in question is socially constructed such that
today’s decisionmakers may choose a new arrangement and (2) a new arrangement is
justified because (a) today’s decisionmakers have not adequately participated in
establishing or validating the existing arrangement and/or (b) the arrangement is
otherwise imperfect according to some other normative theory and in view of today’s
facts, values, or judgment. This combination matches the elements of commonplace
normative argument: feasibility of change, process defects behind the status quo, and
substantive superiority of a new arrangement.
The social construction claim is an assertion of present-day freedom to choose.
The dead cannot literally govern our choices, the complaint suggests, and so the living
bear responsibility for continuing or discarding old arrangements. This was Paine’s
position.65 And the claim is importantly true. Positive law is by definition socially
constructed in a modest sense. Without conceding that legal texts are boundlessly
manipulable in accord with the reader’s preferences, it should be a point of consensus
that living human beings are responsible for creating and perpetuating positive law and
legal institutions. Anthony Kronman made this point eloquently by connecting culture
with law: Both are perishable.66 Although one can reject his further argument that the
living generation is obligated to follow through on projects started in the past,67 he is
correct that some portion of law is defunct without affirmative effort from the living to
abide and transmit it to newcomers. In this policy space we may, but need not, choose to
follow the directives of a statute or a will or a trust or a constitution or any other
document left over from the past.
Recognizing the mutability of legal norms does essentially nothing on the normative
side, however. Social construction observations may reveal options but the motive for
change must come from norms.68 Two categories of normative objection to the status
quo might be distinguished. The first is a process objection that those affected by an
arrangement should have the opportunity to participate in its creation or perpetuation.
This might call for individualized consent, or majoritarian democracy, or some other
group decision rule; it could be animated by a deontological respect for autonomy, or a
communitarian demand for responsibility, or a consequentialist determination that the
most accurate judgments will be made by affected parties. These possibilities suggest
different remedies. Jefferson’s emphasis on prompting every generation to reconsider
legal arrangements may indicate a communitarian vision, while Paine’s toleration of
unrepealed law connects the participation objection to actual shifts in popular
preferences.69 In any case, the concern is with repetition of past practices without
65

Paine, Rights of Man, supra note , at 12.
See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029, 1053 (1990).
67
See id. at 1067—68 (making the argument); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 Yale L.J. 177,
212–13 (1993) [hereinafter Brown, Tradition and Insight] (critiquing the argument).
68
See Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and
Practice 297, 314–16 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992); Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of
Disability?, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1251, 1253, 1281–85 (2007).
69
See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
66
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contemporary validation. And nobody alive today participated in enacting any federal
constitutional text prior to the Sixteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1913.
Dead hand critics usually have normative objections beyond participation. After all,
the social construction claim threatens to explode the participation objection. The former
asserts current power over legal arrangements while the latter complains about a lack of
present-day influence. Reconciling these positions demands a controversial theory of
participation. As well, if a multigenerational arrangement is otherwise perfect (or
unanimously thought so), then the dead hand argument is virtually over.
Charging the current order with imperfection may require another easily contested
normative standard but serious complaints do exist. Perhaps the Constitution does not
adequately reflect the need for executive power in a setting where the United States
government is a global actor and rapid technological change makes legislation and
judicial adjudication less reliable. Consider as well the fret that we lack a sensible plan
for governing in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist strike on the Capitol.70 In addition,
some egalitarians suggest the Constitution undercuts economic equality,71 while populist
democrats worry that the text skews toward small rural states and an elite political class.72
Less ideologically charged critiques are also available.73 Regardless, dead hand
complaints usually will incorporate an attack on the content of legal arrangements
designed for, not just by, an earlier time. And the Constitution might present a unique
mark for dead hand criticism. Most of the text is exceptionally old, the formal
amendment process is uncommonly demanding, and the government it frames
importantly influences domestic society and the international order.
But perhaps a multigenerational arrangement is not categorically special. Maybe a
new generation of decisionmakers—if we can agree on what that means—is unnecessary
for the general complaint to apply. Consider a colonial regime in which one nation
dominates another territory for commercial gain. From the perspective of the colonial
rulers, this arrangement is contingent on their ongoing choices; from the perspective of
the governed population, the arrangement may be unjustifiable because of insufficient
popular validation or other moral principle regarding subordination. It is hardly apparent
that the situation is less troubling than one generation creating legal norms that are (taken
as) binding on the next. Dead hand arguments are a species of all arguments over
appropriate decisionmakers. In fact dead hand complaints are less distressing to the
extent they assume the feasibility of change by affected parties. Truly subordinated
populations have no such choice.
Yet the attraction of dead hand complaints in the cross-generational context could
be just this message of freedom to depart. The complaint is designed to achieve an
70

See James C. Ho, Ensuring the Continuity of Government in Times of Crisis: An Analysis of the
Ongoing Debate in Congress, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1049, 1050–54 (2004) (noting difficulty in repopulating
House of Representatives).
71
See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights”: A Bicentennial
Perspective, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453, 453–58 (1992); Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L.
Rev. 765, 774–80 (1992) (emphasizing private hierarchies).
72
See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution 11, 24 (2006) (recommending new constitutional
convention); see also Robert Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? 92–119, 168–69 tbl.5
(2001) (comparing policy performance in other democracies).
73
See infra text accompanying notes 165–173.
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energizing sense that there is no spirit world dictating the continuation of ancient
imperfection, that the maintenance of law and institutions is contingent on the complicity
of living decisionmakers, that these decisionmakers ought to justify the status quo
without assuming it is natural or necessary, and that the present might well decide to
respect new facts, values, and judgments. When the arrangement in question has lasted
for multiple generations, moreover, the sense of opportunity may interact with a concern
that past judgments cannot possibly be optimal today. For some observers, this is true of
the Constitution. The original text was ratified for a population that was comparatively
tiny, crowded against the eastern seaboard, economically backward, isolated by crude
transportation and communications technology, tolerant of one human being owning
others, wedded to narrow gender roles, religiously parochial, and little more than a bit
player on the world stage.74 Formal amendments followed but they have not addressed
every plausible objection. The Article V procedure will almost certainly remain difficult,
while the instances and magnitude of regretful fidelity will either remain stable or
increase. The normative side of the dead hand complaint therefore has a disconcerting,
and possibly increasing, attraction.75
C. An Invincible Constitutional Text?
But our legal reality is not so fluid. In fact the dead hand complaint against the
Constitution is at least partly moot. Not because the normative arguments are
nonstarters. The problem is with the social construction claim. As a technical matter, we
are responsible for perpetuating older legal norms; as a practical matter, however, the
opportunity for departure is restricted.
Stickiness in positive law arises from multiple sources, some of which academics
are only beginning to model with any confidence. A well-recognized if not wellunderstood mechanism of friction is legal and popular culture. Whether or not earlier
generations hoped the document would become invincible,76 the Constitution is an icon
and widely touted as enforceable law. Officials are still sworn to support “the
Constitution” and these officers and private parties refer to the text in countless disputes,
with some effect on arguments. Granted, popular knowledge of the document’s content
is limited and much of the text has an open-ended appearance. Furthermore, flat cultural
explanations for ongoing phenomena are thin renderings of the dynamics that create
patterned values and behavior. But we need not be more clever if the goal is to know the
document’s stature in popular and legal culture. It seems secure for now, and surely
74

Cf. Klarman, supra note 11, at 381–87 (rejecting fidelity to the founders); Thurgood Marshall,
Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5
(1987) (“‘We the People’ no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong to the framers.”).
75
Some suggest the dead hand complaint against the Constitution ought to be rejected because it proves too
much, jeopardizing dated statutes, judicial precedent, and so on. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Moment and
the Millennium: A Question of Time, or Law?, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1112, 1115 (1998). Strong reasons
exist for treating this material as valid law, but pervasive applicability of the complaint is not an effective
answer to it. Maybe we have a systematic problem of slavish respect for antique law.
76
See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 1 Letters and Other Writings of
James Madison, supra note 14, at 503, 503–04 (arguing the virtues of stability and the propriety of
intergenerational respect); Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 239, 275–81 (1989) (indicating that many at the founding hoped for an indefinite
Constitution); see also The Federalist No. 49, at 314–16 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(objecting to frequent conventions).

Forthcoming in 108 Columbia Law Review
Draft of 12/30/2007

16

more culturally entrenched than the pre-Civil War era.77 To the extent constitutional text
is now encoded in culture, possibly nobody has a meaningful short-run choice to
repudiate it.
Second, multidisciplinary work on path dependence and process sequencing is
inching toward a sophisticated understanding of lasting institutions. Roughly speaking,
this work investigates the influence of prior conditions and the order of events on
subsequent outcomes, especially where those past conditions and sequences were in some
sense arbitrary or suboptimal. Path dependence observations became popular in
economic development studies some time ago,78 and political scientists are applying
those lessons to government institutions. Paul Pierson, for example, investigates positive
feedback mechanisms in politics that may perpetuate institutional rules, mobilization
patterns, and thinking about politics.79 Among the reasons for perpetuation are setup
costs for an alternative system, learning effects from familiarity with the current system,
network effects from mass participation, and expectation adaptation as institutional
patterns appear stable.80
There is nothing irrational about these reasons for stability. Transition costs are
real costs. True, path dependence is often used to unsettle assumptions that competition
and learning yield efficiency;81 this accounts for vigorous debate over whether and what
kind of path dependence is illustrated by the QWERTY keyboard arrangement.82 But we
are considering the stickiness of textual respect, not its desirability. And while path
dependence is relatively easy to identify when it comes to the gene pool for the human
77

See Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government in American Constitutional Theory 59
(1992) (noting that between 1790 and 1850 American political self-identity shifted from role of statecreator to that of state-maintainer); Michael Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself 3 (1986) (“[F]or
almost two centuries, [the Constitution] has been swathed in . . . a fulsome rhetoric of reverence more than
offset by the reality of ignorance.”); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American
Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1335, 1340,
1398–1405 (2006) (discussing relationship between American exceptionalism and public reverence for
Constitution); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1984).
78
See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy 112–13 (1994);
Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 93–100, 112, 137 (1990);
Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 483 (1991).
79
See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 10 (2004); see also Scott E.
Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q. J. Pol. Sci. 87, 88–89 (2006) (categorizing different types of historical
dependence). For a contrasting argument that codified political institutions are often fluid in practice, see
Gerard Alexander, Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation, 13 J. Theoretical Pol.
249, 251–52 (2001).
80
See Pierson, supra note 79, at 24 (following Arthur, supra note 78, at 112).
81
See, e.g., Paul A. David, Heroes, Herds and Hysteresis in Technological History: Thomas Edison and
‘The Battle of the Systems’ Reconsidered, 1 Indus. & Corp. Change 129, 137–40 (1992); Mark J. Roe,
Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 641, (643–62) (1996).
82
This is now the standard letter arrangement for personal computer keyboards in the U.S., although text
messaging from cellular telephones illustrates a crack in QWERTY dominance. Compare, e.g., Paul A.
David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 332, 333–36 (1985) (attributing its
success for typewriters to path dependence, and noting that arrangement allowed salesmen to type
“typewriter” quickly during demonstrations), with, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 205, 206–08 (1995) (distinguishing claims that t-1
decision was suboptimal over some time frame based on whether better choice was feasibly recognizable at
t-1).
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species or the location of the U.S. Capitol Building, it is a mistake to believe that culture,
positive law, and institutions are more ephemeral as a rule. The Constitution is not only
reflected in living institutions. Its status as a source of law involves an ongoing practice
that might be self-reinforcing. Many have learned the Constitution’s terms and the
practice of referring to text during debate (or at least avoiding clearly contradicting
conventional readings of the text), many expect this pattern of behavior to continue, and
many may fear the risks and costs of attempting to transition and recoordinate in a new
equilibrium. The Constitution might be law’s version of a QWERTY keyboard.
Textual reference has become sufficiently patterned that it is worth considering
how much of the constitutional text would change if Article V were eliminated and the
document were amendable like an ordinary statute. Quite possibly nothing, although
unpopular Supreme Court interpretations of the text would be in jeopardy. This
prediction is most intuitive for matters of government structure. Around the world, shifts
between parliamentary and presidential systems are rare.83 Not one has occurred in the
U.S. at the state level, even though their formal amendment processes seem less
demanding than Article V. Equally striking are the data on bicameralism. After the
Court denied states the ability to apportion legislative districts in ways substantially
departing from equal population,84 the rationale for state senates weakened. Yet not a
single state shifted to unicameralism in response. Only four states have tried that
structure in our history and only one still has it today.85 True, persistent structures might
signify a locked-in political class. But the point is that Article V-like procedures are not
the only sources of constitutional stability. Far from it.
So in some ways the status of the Constitution as law is a topic of no importance.
Culture and path dependence resolve the issue for now. Debating the text’s rightful
authority might then be a theoretical parlor game, with no obvious answer and no
significance other than to provide a gauge of how badly we should regret the past. Along
these lines, Henry Monaghan once concluded that the Constitution’s authority is neither a
necessary nor a proper legal question:
The authoritative status of the written constitution is a legitimate matter of
debate for political theorists interested in the nature of political obligation.
That status is, however, an incontestable first principle for theorizing
about American constitutional law. . . . For the purposes of legal
reasoning, the binding quality of the constitutional text is itself incapable
of and not in need of further demonstration. It is our master rule of
recognition . . . .86
II. AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION
There are at least two practical reasons for continuing dead hand arguments about
the Constitution, even if there is no doubt about its status as law. The first is a set of
long-term concerns which I will ignore. Scrapping the document might become realistic
83

See Arend Lijphart, Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland: 1989–1991, 4 J. Theoretical Pol. 207, 208 (1992) (arguing that changes to “the fundamental
constitutional structure” are rare in established democracies).
84
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571–77 (1964).
85
See Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Representation 259 (1965).
86
Monaghan, Perfect Constitution, supra note 1, at 383–84 (footnotes omitted).
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in the future—the Articles of Confederation did not last forever, while written
constitutions in other nations regularly disappear within a generation87—and an ongoing
inquiry into the text’s value can make that future judgment better informed. It could also
combat a risky status quo bias. Dead hand debate might produce the right mix of comfort
and discomfort with the existing order.
A second reason is more immediate. A group of theorists over the last twenty
years has asserted that a defensible method of textual interpretation cannot be constructed
without knowing why the text in question is law. Interpretation is an ongoing necessity.
No thoughtful observer believes that uncertainty about the Constitution’s meaning will be
eliminated in the near term, or ever. Insofar as a persuasive theory of authority drives a
justifiable method of interpretation, we are in need of the former regardless of how
certain we are that the Constitution counts as law. This Part introduces the conceptual
components of this thought.
A. Theories of Authority
In accord with relevant scholarship,88 theories of authority should be understood
with a particular goal in mind. An authority theory is a test designed to ascertain what
counts as enforceable or respect-worthy law. It is an if/then proposition: If some test is
satisfied, then the subject tested counts as valid law or law worthy of someone’s respect.
This testing function is not a commitment to find law in a given context, much
less to create good law. These theories are supposed to be less encumbered than that. An
authority theory need not suggest what quantity of material should pass its test; an
authority theorist might well prefer less law to more, and her theory will function
regardless of how much law it finds. In addition, authority theories ought to be separated
from general directives to “do good.” Such directives might influence interpretation but
they cannot be issued by an authority theory alone. If authority theories become too
bound up with normative commitments, they jeopardize one of their asserted goals—
guiding the interpretation of law without descending to ground-level moral debates over
abortion policy, gun control, and the like. They need to be theories of the law rather than
simply theories of the good. And if they were the latter, any special role for legal
authority would be unclear. In this sense, advocates of the authority/interpretation
relationship are trying to do more with less.89
This restriction still leaves an array of options for authority theories. The
questions of law’s definition and respect-worthiness have a massive history of intricate
logic and lasting disagreement within Western jurisprudence alone. Fortunately, present
purposes call for only general knowledge of the field, in part because constitutional
theory has its own set of standard arguments that imperfectly overlap with the teachings
87

See Tom Ginsburg et al., The Lifespan of Written Constitutions 1 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1934&context=alea (estimating written national
constitutions lasted sixteen years on average since 1789).
88
See infra Part II.C.
89
For their part, legal positivists might believe that normative evaluation of law will be easier if we refuse
to pass moral judgment on candidates for law at the validity stage. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 597–98, 615–21 (1958) (applying this argument to
Nazi law).
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of jurisprudence.
To be elementary, what we call law tends to include behavioral norms in the form
of commands backed by threat of force or softer encouragements, in addition to protocols
for building institutions and fostering human collaboration.90 The issue for an authority
theory is law’s source or grounding. H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition and Hans Kelsen’s
Grundnorm famously rely on official practice rather than normative justification to
identify valid law.91 Hart’s ultimate rule of recognition sets the test of legal validity for
all downstream rules, and it is identified by acceptance of the regime’s officials and
reflection in their practices.92 If officials accept and refer to the Constitution as a font of
valid law, that is the end of the analytical line on the text’s legal validity.93
There are competing views, of course. One might instead demand that, before
any norm can rightly qualify for the label of law, its content must satisfy a basic
normative test.94 A dispute over this requirement divides modern natural law theorists
from legal positivists.95 Perhaps truly evil norms will gain respect if they are called law
by theorists and others, or maybe norms flunking a minimal test of goodness are too
unstable to warrant the label. Whatever the case, philosophy has subdivided the
normative questions into law’s legitimacy, law’s authority, and the obligation to obey
law. Legitimacy is the question whether a given law or legal system is justifiably
enforced—a question aimed most directly at those who administer the law.96 Authority is
the question whether the status of law can add a good moral reason to believe (theoretical
authority) or behave (practical authority) in accord with law.97 Obligation is the affiliated
question whether a person subject to a behavioral norm has a moral reason to obey just
because of the norm’s status as law.98
90

See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence
13–26 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954) (stressing commands); cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 26–49 (2d ed.
1994) [hereinafter Hart, Concept of Law] (looking beyond orders backed by threats).
91
See Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 90, at 56–57, 110–16; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and
State 115–24 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961).
92
See Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 90, at 94–117 (describing necessary and sufficient characteristics
of a legal system).
93
See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621, 630–45
(1987) (comparing Constitution to Hartian rule of recognition); Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra
note 10, at 161 (distinguishing national constitutions from rules of recognition on which they rest).
94
See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 57 (1984); cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality
of Law 38–41 (rev. ed. 1969) (listing eight failures—such as incomprehensible, contradictory, or
retroactive rules—that “result[] in something not properly called a legal system at all,” while refraining
from issuing more specific moral requirements for law’s content); id. at 205–06 (stressing law’s ability to
facilitate moral objectives). One might also believe there can be no description of law without evaluation.
95
See Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 79–80 (3d ed. 2003).
96
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1799 (2005).
97
See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 382,
382–85 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence]
(outlining responses to purported paradox that legal authority “is either pernicious or otiose”); Vincent A.
Wellman, Authority of Law, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 573, 574–75
(Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Companion to Philosophy of Law].
98
See Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey Law, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
233, 233, 245–50 (1979) (arguing against any moral obligation to obey law based on its status as law);
Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence, supra note 97, at 514, 514–25
(differentiating legitimacy from obligation).
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The focus on moral reasons shows an interest in motives for respecting law other
than the self-interested fear of sanction. A state trooper might decide to enforce a
speeding law, and a driver might decide to travel more slowly because of that law, only
because doing otherwise jeopardizes the bank accounts of each. But many theorists want
to distinguish rightful authority or ethical action for social good from the effective
exercise of power or action in one’s narrow self-interest. Unsurprisingly, inquiries into
legitimacy, authority, and obligation demand something more than fear as a test for
respect-worthy law. Although these questions can be answered in subtly distinct ways,
the technical differences are not very important here. The concepts are certainly
related,99 and I include them all under the rubric of “authority theory.”100
Perhaps more useful is legal theory’s notion of a content-independent reason.
These are reasons that do not depend on a favorable judgment of law’s content.101 If such
reasons exist, they can be effective in a diverse society that ought to be held together.
Persuasive even when a law’s substance is not, content-independent reasons may
discourage exit, secession, and civil disobedience. Several have been suggested.102 One
such reason is consent to the legal system by which the law was promulgated. Consent
might be given normative weight apart from the law’s content, and the consent theme is
part of an ideologically diverse history of social contractarian theorizing.103 Somewhat
similarly, appropriate hierarchical relationships can justify following the wishes of a
superior. Valid legal texts, such as statutes, are sometimes analogized to the command of
a principal to subordinates including courts. In addition, a person might offer epistemic
deference to law. Following a law might produce morally desirable outcomes more often
than fallible individual evaluation. Furthermore, widespread acceptance of law can have
coordination benefits that allow large numbers of people to achieve mutual gains.104
Coordination justifications might work even if the outcome is not ideal from each
individual’s perspective. One might even have a duty to comply with an unjust law to
help prop up an otherwise acceptable legal system.105
Each of these ideas has a role in constitutional theory. Normative constitutional
theorists explore the desirability of constitutionalism in various forms and across time,
99

For example, it seems clear there is no independent moral obligation to comply with an illegitimate
system. A residual question is whether there is a moral obligation to comply with a law that is legitimately
enforced. See Leslie Green, The Authority of the State 234–40 (1988) [hereinafter Green, Authority of the
State]; Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality 48–50 (1987).
100
Philosophy’s subdivisions do indicate a helpful point, however: what counts as law depends on who
wants to know. See Part III.A.1.
101
See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 35 (1986) [hereinafter Raz, Morality of Freedom]; H.L.A.
Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in Essays on Bentham 243, 254–61 (1982).
102
See Bix, supra note 95, ch. 16.
103
See, e.g., James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 6–15 (1962) (following
individualistic rational actor model); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 137, 217 (2005) [hereinafter Rawls,
Political Liberalism] (asking what all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse); cf. Ronald
Dworkin, Law’s Empire 195–96, 206–07 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law’s Empire] (relying on
associative membership rather than consent).
104
See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 12–18, 87–90, 97–98, 139–40
(1999) (characterizing successful constitutions as self-enforcing conventions).
105
See generally George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation 37–40, 67–69 (1992)
(discussing cooperation for presumptively beneficial public goods); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 115
(1971) (asserting duty to support just institutions).
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along with effective strategies for enforcement.106 The desirability issue leads to a
proliferation of theories that matches the variety of moral perspectives—utilitarian,
egalitarian, libertarian, cosmopolitan, and so on. Furthermore, each moral framework
might apply differently in different contexts. Constitutionalism in the United States
might have to differ from constitutionalism in the United Arab Emirates or the United
Nations. And like legal theory more generally, constitutional theory encompasses
content-dependent and content-independent reasons for adherence to imperfect law. To
keep the analysis manageable, the more prominent constitutional authority theories are
canvassed in Part III. Here I want to emphasize the multiplicity of targets for these
theories.
A constitutional text is only one type of constitutional law, even within the
category of supreme law. A single document can be useful for initiating a new regime
but constitutionalism may rely on other sources. Great Britain has a constrained
constitutional system without a document labeled “supreme law.”107 Analogously, some
might believe that certain traditions ought to qualify as supreme constitutional law in the
United States, regardless of their reflection in a document entitled “The Constitution.”108
Judicial precedent is another possibility. Perhaps Supreme Court decisions declaring
constitutional law are themselves supreme law.109 Functionally they are often treated as
such, in that many nonjudicial actors appear to accept the Court’s claim that it is the final
arbiter of the text’s meaning,110 and the Court is often interested in its own constitutional
doctrine and precedent. Finally, social movements might generate constitutional law
without Article V.111 Depending on the operative theory of authority, more than one
source might qualify as supreme constitutional law, or the Constitution might not qualify
106

See Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 12 (2001) (identifying as “the most fundamental questions of constitutional law” those of
“why the Constitution ought to be obeyed and whether it can be”); Russell Hardin, Constitutionalism, in
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 289, 289–301 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Handbook of Political Economy] (distinguishing contractarian and coordination
theories).
107
Cf. Adam Tomkins, Public Law 7–14 (2003) (minimizing difference between codified and uncodified
constitutions, and stressing that much of England’s constitution actually is written down).
108
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(invoking “the gloss which life has written upon” the text); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 57–68 (1998) (using history for evidence of deep national
commitments).
109
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 96, at 1824 (relying on courts’ embrace of precedent and public’s
acceptance of such decisions); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev.
703, 706–10 (1975) (accepting judicial exposition of certain national ideals that are “not expressed as a
matter of positive law in the written Constitution”).
110
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). There are, of course, other views.
See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts ch. 1 (1999) (rejecting judicial
supremacy); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1359–69
(2006) (arguing that democratic societies should determine members’ rights through legislative processes,
given certain conditions).
111
See 2 Ackerman, supra note 47, at 20–25 (describing five-phase process through which political
developments bring about constitutional change outside Article V framework); cf. Reva B. Siegal, Text in
Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297, 299–
303 (2001) (exploring relationship of social movements outside courts to textual meaning and judicial
interpretation).
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while another source does, or perhaps nothing should qualify as categorically supreme.
For now, however, the goal is to understand the relationship between theories of
the Constitution’s authority and the methods for interpreting that one text. These theories
might be descriptive or normative, content-dependent or content-independent. But to
make the authority/interpretation assessment manageable, it is best to begin with the
Constitution alone.
B. Methods of Interpretation
Interpretive methods must be distinct from authority theories for the latter to drive
the former. And yet on one account, they are not: The function of both is to identify law.
Authority theories tell us what counts as law while interpretation yields law’s meaning.
It could also be true that authority theories are impossible to apply without an interpretive
method. For instance, if the operative authority theory is Hartian legal positivism, can
one ascertain the practice and acceptance of officials without a method for interpreting
information regarding official behavior? But to animate the asserted relationship, there is
an intuitive distinction. One might suppose interpretation is a method by which textual
meaning is specified, while authority theories identify which texts are targets for legal
interpretation. This distinction is unstable in places but it might be workable.
Even so, explaining which practices qualify as interpretation is challenging. A
group of literary theorists and their compatriots in law maintain that interpretation is by
definition an inquiry into authorial intent. If a reader is not interested in this intent, he is
not “interpreting”; perhaps he cannot even confirm disagreements over textual
meaning.112 Others persistently disagree. They contend that an honest interpretive effort
can reflect other considerations—such as concern for fair warning by attention to
ordinary word meaning, or adherence to precedent about meaning, or sensitivity to just
outcomes under new circumstances.113 They claim that readers can, do, and at least
sometimes should resolve meaning in this fashion.
If this were solely a fight over a definition, the controversy would be trivial—and
puzzling in its intensity. But more might be at stake, depending on what function
interpretation will serve. Indeed the dispute over proper interpretive method seems
unresolvable without a given objective and institutional setting, which will reveal the
interpreter’s unique capacities and dynamic relationships with others.114 Excellent

112

See, e.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution: A Response
to David Hoy, in Legal Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 187, 193–97 (stating, however, that their definition
of interpretation does not yield any insight into how intent should be ascertained).
113
See, e.g., Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 103, at 348–50 (departing from subjective drafter intent);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 58–64 (1994) (emphasizing interpreter’s
perspective); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3, 17 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (rejecting use of subjective and unexpressed legislative intent as “incompatible with
democratic government”).
114
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 952, 954 (2003); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1263–64 (1978) (arguing that institutional
constraints prevent justices from enforcing every aspect of the Constitution as they might understand it);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (2003)
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“interpretation” will not look the same for a vacationer reading a poem for pleasure, a
sergeant reading a superior officer’s orders, and an Article III judge reading the
Constitution during adjudication. When literary theorists and lawyers dispute the
acceptable reach of interpretation, they might have different assumptions about the
ramifications of their debate.115 In any case, a core concern will be what officials and
others do with legal texts within concrete decision processes.
This last point has two implications for testing the authority/interpretation
relationship. First, we ought to remember that institutional and empirical factors could
overrun any logical influence of an authority theory on interpretive method. The
institutional location might be far more important to interpretation and sound
decisionmaking than any convincing authority theory. For instance, perhaps subjective
drafter intent or the moral truth of the matter is not feasible for a Supreme Court justice to
ascertain competently, even if the best theory of textual authority points in one of those
directions. But these institutional factors may be disputed and would leave the asserted
authority/interpretation relationship uncontested on its own terms. Instead the assertion
can be challenged directly, to the extent possible holding aside institutional and related
empirical factors.
Second, this generosity in bracketing institutional objections should not be
canceled out by a narrow definition of interpretive method. Limiting interpretation to a
hunt for authorial intent constricts the set of practices that authority theories might
influence. A broader understanding of interpretation increases the range of potential
implications, without taking a position on the best definition. A conveniently broad
definition of interpretation is then a process by which meaning is derived from a text in
order to help resolve a dispute, especially when there is disagreement over the meaning
of that text.116
This notion can be filled out by reference to familiar choices commonly
associated with legal interpretation. As an initial matter, the interpreter must have a sense
of the appropriate linguistic rules. The Constitution is thought to be written in English at
various points in that language’s development, rather than in code resembling English,
and so presumably readers do well to follow corresponding rules of syntax. A second
interpretive strategy adds sources for understanding the text and specifies the relationship
among them.117 Examples include ratification era history, tradition thereafter, purposes
associated with the text, plus—to the extent used to construe existing text—moral theory

(positing that debates about legal interpretation must take into account institutional capacities and dynamic
effects); supra note 17.
115
See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Law and Interpretation, in Companion to Philosophy of Law, supra
note 97, at 126, 126 (relating interpretation to application and dispute resolution); Paul Brest, Constitutional
Interpretation, in 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 626, 626 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L.
Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000) (similar).
116
Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence,
supra note 97, at 268, 268–70 (including text, original meaning, underlying rationale or basic values,
application to particular cases, and stare decisis); Martin Stone, Focusing the Law: What Legal
Interpretation Is Not, in Law and Interpretation 31, 35–36 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (identifying
“everyday notion” according to which interpretation is called for only in cases of ambiguity).
117
See generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11–22 (1991) (identifying six modalities of
constitutional argument).
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with attention to consequences.118 Some or all might be admissible. Third, interpretive
methods also might incorporate canons or presumptions of various strengths. For
constitutions, an interpreter might presume that no violation occurs unless the
transgression is “clear.”119 Thematic readings fit here as well.120 If the document is
otherwise best read to achieve some value (its relatively clear provisions so suggest), then
the interpreter might create a presumption that ambiguities should be resolved so as to
further this value. Finally, stare decisis often is considered part of interpretive method.
Interpreters might take a prior interpretation as conclusive, informative, or something in
between.121
There is a complication with including stare decisis within the practice of
interpretation, however. It is the brittle distinction between sources of information used
to interpret text, as opposed to new sources of law that are authoritative independent of
that text.122 This distinction is required by the asserted relationship between authority
and interpretation. For a theory of authority to influence interpretive method for the
Constitution, we must be able to determine when the Constitution as a text is being
“interpreted” and when distinct sources of constitutional law are being created. A strong
version of stare decisis, one that makes past decisions conclusive and unalterable without
textual amendment, strains the distinction.
To make sense of the asserted
authority/interpretation relationship, attention must be confined to the use of precedent
and other sources of information for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution as a text.
C. An Asserted Relationship
The relationship to be tested is unidirectional: Authority theories are supposed to
influence interpretive method. A weak version of this assertion would be that certain
authority theories are sometimes relevant to interpretive method.123 But often the
assertion is stronger, maintaining that a theory of authority is necessary for constructing
an appropriate interpretive method. Perhaps some scholars believe that authority theories
can be sufficient for this purpose, but the necessity claim is prominent.
In one respect, the necessity claim is obviously false. A reader can interpret a text
while ignorant of the text’s status as law or even confident that the text is not law. The
Articles of Confederation are not law today and yet anyone can read a copy and deploy
interpretive techniques to gain information from that text. Similarly, a reader is free to
retain doubts about the legal validity of our purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment while
118

Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1225, 1228
(1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law] (suggesting possible value of cautiously
analyzed foreign experience).
119
See Thayer, supra note 33, at 144.
120
See supra notes 31–32 (collecting sources).
121
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1362–63 (1988)
(describing different levels of deference Supreme Court gives to common law, constitutional, and statutory
precedents).
122
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (asserting that some respect for
precedent is necessitated by “the very concept of the rule of law”).
123
For cautious language, see Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 10, at 157 (warning against
analogies to nonconstitutional law); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 82–84
(2000) (indicating an authority theory is only one influence on interpretation and stressing empirical
questions).
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comfortably interpreting its words. And it is possible to ignore the undoubted legal status
of a document, such as the Constitution, while thinking through its ambiguities. Better
pleasure reading exists but this does not foreclose a review of the Constitution for the
sole purpose of leisure and without regard to how the text ought to be used in any other
setting.
Thus the asserted relationship will make sense only within certain interpretive
situations. These situations are connected to the production of law. More specifically,
the asserted relationship can be taken as advice to a legal decisionmaker, such as a judge
or legislator or executive official, regarding the normatively appropriate interpretive
method for valid law. These officials use interpretation to generate (or clarify) valid law
which they are obligated to follow and which presumably influences others in the
community. Once this situation is specified, a relationship between authority and
interpretation gains plausibility. In fact, some sort of relationship becomes undeniable.
By identifying what counts as law, authority theories create subject matter for
interpretation by legal decisionmakers. One might say that authority theories isolate
law’s raw material, while interpretive method processes these sources into more useful
data for decisionmaking. Given the right setting, then, authority theories have at least
this targeting relationship to interpretation. And to this extent, the asserted relationship
cannot be fully separated from an institutional context.
The live question is whether an authority theory has any more specific influence
on interpretive method for legal decisionmakers. This kind of claim has been vetted in
the field of statutory interpretation to help resolve disagreement over which sources of
information beyond the text should be consulted.124 Faced with the question whether to
consult legislative history, the interpreter might decide to do so based on a particular
account of the statute’s authority. If the statute is authoritative because the legislature is
likely to arrive at normatively correct decisions, then it might be appropriate to recover
more information about legislator judgments. There are other possible conclusions and
important considerations, but the simple idea is that authority might logically guide
statutory interpretation.125
The asserted relationship seems most tight for orders within hierarchies. Suppose
your employer asks you to perform a task and her order is not clear to you. You know
that she communicated in English but you cannot execute the order without more
information. Perhaps your reason for caring about the order will help you interpret it:
You might consider your employer the principal for whom you are an agent acting in her
interest, and arguably you should interpret her command in a way that comports with her
needs or desires, as best as you can discern them. Granted, other considerations may
inform your decision. Principal/agent relationships have slack and you might inject your
own best judgment; indeed you might believe that your superior’s rank and
trustworthiness recommend leaving her at her word and acting in light of only the
124

See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 Yale L.J. 945, 1009–10, 1027–28 (1990) (arguing
for a “non-communicative” model of legislation under which legislatures are conceptualized as theoretical
authorities, and recommending that courts therefore “interpret statutes in light of the purposes that they
may best be made to serve”).
125
See Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in Law and Interpretation, supra note 116, at 406, 432
[hereinafter Hurd, Interpreting Authorities] (“[T]he authority we assign to law determines, in large part, the
method by which we must interpret legal texts.”).
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unsupplemented order. Or realizing your limited ability to accurately infer unspoken
wishes and the optimal course for the organization, you might avoid guessing and do the
least work consistent with the text of her command. Or you might simply return to her
for clarification. Even so, the connection between authority and interpretation is
probably intuitive here and its character might offer some boundaries on interpretive
decisions.
Can the same be said for interpretation of the Constitution? Some believe the
answer is yes. Prominent advocates of the unidirectional authority/interpretation
relationship have been originalists or textualists, including Michael McConnell and Frank
Easterbrook. “For the textualist,” Easterbrook says, “a theory of political legitimacy
comes first, followed by a theory of interpretation that is appropriate to the theory of
obligation.”126 But the list is longer. Jed Rubenfeld endorses the central importance of
an authority theory for constitutional interpretation, and uses it to conclude that his
paradigm cases should be the guide. “[L]egitimation precedes interpretation,” he
writes.127 As well, certain proponents of a moral reading of the Constitution allege that
this interpretive directive is connected to their reasons for treating the text as law.128
Joseph Raz denies that aged constitutions are legitimate because of the authority of their
makers, but he accepts that proper interpretation partly turns on an account of
Similarly, David Strauss maintains that unsurprising
constitutional authority.129
conventional readings are normally required by Burkean conservatism and a coordination
theory of authority for the written Constitution.130 Critical theorists also might relate
authority to interpretation. Mike Seidman contends that, once we answer whether the
Constitution ought to and can be obeyed, questions about what the Constitution

126

Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 1119; see also Bork, supra note 11, at 143–44 (equating law and original
intent); Larry Alexander, Takings of Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 223,
226 (1986) (“[A] method of constitutional interpretation must reflect why the Constitution is considered
authoritative . . . .”); McConnell, supra note 2, at 1128; cf. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young,
Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730, 744
(2000) (“[A]n account of constitutional obligation . . . is a necessary component of theories of interpretation
because it specifies which interpretations are to count as erroneous and which as correct.”).
127
Jed Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, in Constitutionalism, supra note 10, at 194, 198
[hereinafter Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation].
128
See Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation
Be Justified?, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1482, 1486–89 (1985); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the
Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 Duke L.J. 1, 2, 54 (1993)
(tracing constitutional authority to substantive goodness, asserting that adherence to constitutional norms is
a strategic way to build popular support for just policy, and recommending figurative readings of the text);
Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev.
2087, 2098, 2100–01, 2115 (2001) (“The connection [between constitutional authority and interpretation] is
almost as straightforward as the injunction that if you want to hit something, it is best to aim right at it.”).
129
See Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 10, at 157, 173–78 (arguing that continuity is good
moral reason for perpetuating multigenerational constitution, and that judges should carry over that insight
when making judgments about how much innovation should be allowed during adjudication).
130
See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 11, at 911–13 (asserting that conventionalist account of text
“gives relatively specific guidance about how to interpret the text”); see also Strauss, Jefferson’s Principle,
supra note 11, at 1732, 1744 (“[T]he objective, in interpreting the text, is to make sure that the text can
continue to serve as common ground.”).
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commands “more or less answer themselves.”131
FIGURE 1: ASSERTED RELATIONSHIP
1.
Authority
Theory

contractarian

good content

stability

brute fact

2.
Interpretive
Method

originalist

moral

conventional/
common law

thematic

meaning1

meaning2

meaning3

meaning4

3.
Meaning

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the asserted relationship in three steps. In
Step 1, an authority theory filters potential sources of law, including supreme law.
Candidate sources are endless: God’s will; natural law; ratified constitutional text;
tradition; precedent; revered federal statutes; international law; popular sentiment;
everything called ordinary law. After these sources are weeded and prioritized by an
appropriate theory, a measure of vagueness will persist. In Step 2, an interpretive method
is chosen to yield additional meaning at Step 3, which might include legal doctrine to
guide future decisions. Authority theories are supposed to influence proper interpretive
method, and some theories that have been linked to particular methods are connected
with dotted lines: contractarian theories with originalism, good content theories with
moral readings, and stability theories with conventionalism or common law method.
Brute fact theories, which are descriptive positivist accounts of valid law, have not been
prominently associated with a particular method of constitutional interpretation; nor do
thematic readings have an apparent companion authority theory, though good content
theories might match. But the graphic’s basic message is an analytic sequence running
from authority to interpretation to meaning.
131

Seidman, supra note 106, at 18 (referring as well to questions of how Constitution should be enforced);
see id. at 12 (defining key questions); id. at 59–60.
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III. THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
We are now in a position to grapple with influential theories of constitutional
authority and their connection to interpretive method. The former are grouped into (1)
brute fact theories, which are descriptive, (2) good content theories, which are normative,
(3) contractarian theories and (4) stability theories, which are both normative but
(largely) content-independent, and (5) a brief treatment of postmodern unsettlement.132 I
will argue that brute fact theories have essentially no relationship to interpretive method;
that good content theories are influenced by interpretive method as much as the reverse;
that contractarian theories would influence interpretation if only they were persuasive
accounts of our Constitution as law; and that the other theories have weak logical
connections to interpretation on the order of mild side constraints.133 But three
preliminary questions about authority theories should be addressed first.
A. Authority Questions
1. Authority as to whom? — Addressees of authority theories matter. To consider
intelligently whether a person ought to obey or enforce law is to have a particular person
in mind. In addition to its jurisdictional boundaries, much law is designed for a subset of
the political community. Consider all the provisions in the Constitution authorizing
government institutions and offices and indicating the ambit of their lawful authority.
Their immediate addressees are officials. Obviously it would be silly to deny the
significance of the text for the entire political community, yet the relevance of authority
theories does differ across classes of persons.134 For instance, officials and naturalized
citizens take an oath to support the Constitution while most others do not. As with sound
interpretive method, the question whether a law is authoritative partly depends on who
needs to know the answer.135 For convenience, the discussion below often assumes the
pertinent question is the Constitution’s authority with respect to officials. This simplifies
the analysis, follows the text’s most common addressees, and leaves room for a variety of
theories. There will be places in the analysis where the general population is relevant,
however, and these will be noted.
2. Authority of what strength? — An affiliated question is the strength of law’s
132

Compare Frank Michelman’s division of existential, rational, and decisional bases for treating a
constitution as binding, which match my first three categories. See Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional
Authorship, in Constitutionalism, supra note 10, at 64, 65–66 [hereinafter Michelman, Constitutional
Authorship]. I separate stability from good content theories because their connections to interpretive
method are different.
133
A popular justification for respecting the Constitution combines a finding that the text’s content is
passably good with a conclusion that departure would entail serious instability costs. See, e.g., Fallon,
supra note 96, at 1792; Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 10, at 173; Strauss, Common Law,
supra note 11, at 898; Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1771–75 (2005). This combination is
powerful and is referred to below.
134
Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 719, 727 (2006) (investigating rules of recognition and concluding
that “[p]ropositions about U.S. constitutional law . . . are true or false relative to the practices of a stipulated
group”); Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 345, 362–65 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida’s Way] (applying Rawlsian overlapping
consensus).
135
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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authority. It can vary. An authority theory for a law might be relevant to a class of
people yet differentially persuasive among them; and a theory’s persuasiveness might
change over time. Beyond prudential reasons for respecting law, there is a set of
conventional approaches in legal theory for measuring the strength of an obligation to
law. Law might be only one moral consideration, a suggestive bit of information about
good behavior; or it might warrant a prima facie duty overcome by convincing reasons of
the same order; or it might provide an exclusionary reason for behavior that knocks out
competing moral considerations, at least in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.136
Nothing restricts the question of authority to a binary yes-or-no choice. For the most
part, however, the strength dimension will be irrelevant to the analysis in this Part. It
tests the relationship between various authority theories and interpretive methods for the
Constitution as a text. Authority theories that are unpersuasive drop out, while viable
authority theories might be connected or disconnected from interpretive method
regardless of their strength. The relevance of the strength dimension to multiple sources
of law is postponed until Part IV.
3. Authority in what unit? — It is sometimes intimated that the Constitution
should be judged as an undifferentiated unit, and that we must or ought to respect all of
the text or none of it.137 This could be called “the Sinatra problem” for the Constitution’s
authority.138 It could be the result of several dynamics. First, incomplete authority might
be infeasible. Any remaining respect for the document could unravel once a piece of it is
overtly shorn from the domain of enforceable law. Second, it might be too costly to
devise and implement a test for which parts of the Constitution should continue in force.
Furthermore, partial authority is in tension with public pronouncements and popular
understanding, to the extent it exists. No official declares that the Constitution is our
nation’s fundamental legal charter—except for Article IV. Maybe these assurances count
for something.
The necessity of a unitary judgment is, however, open to question. Whatever the
popular impression, the true significance of many textual provisions has shifted over
time. The Privileges or Immunities Clause had almost no real-world influence until
recently,139 while the Contracts Clause received some early attention but today is almost a
dead letter.140 Much of this is the product of changing fashions in judicial intervention,
and we should not forget that constitutional norms are followed for other reasons. But
the changes have been significant. Indeed, episodes of innovation in the modern
administrative state might amount to departures from the Article V process for updating

136

See, e.g., Green, Authority of the State, supra note 99, at 36–39 & n.31 (distinguishing advice from
exclusionary reasons); Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 101, at 46–47, 53, 57–59 (explaining variable
strength of even preemptive reasons that attach to practical authority).
137
See Whittington, supra note 23, at 84 (“Ultimately, a system of governance must be accepted or rejected
as a whole.”); Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 874, 878
(2006) (“If modern politicians and judges can pick and choose which aspects of the Constitution to
respect . . . , then entrenchment is a fiction . . . .”).
138
Cf. Frank Sinatra, All or Nothing at All, on Reprise: The Very Good Years (Reprise Records 1991).
139
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999) (guaranteeing equal welfare benefits to newly arrived state
citizens).
140
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429–34, 442–45 (1934) (permitting a
temporary mortgage foreclosure moratorium).
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the text.141 Moreover, constructing a method for partial textual fidelity is not beyond
human ability. The doctrine of stare decisis could be adapted and applied to
constitutional text; perhaps that is roughly current practice.142 And evaluating the
authority of the entire Constitution presents its own set of challenges.143
The more crucial point is that the relationship between authority theories and
constitutional interpretation can be tested regardless of whether the document is viewed
as an undifferentiated whole. There is no apparent reason for the influence on
interpretation to vary with the severity of a Sinatra problem. As for contractarian
theories, they are designed to justify the entire Constitution based on ratification
processes. These theories ought to be assessed on that basis. For the other theory
categories, we only need to know whether they are plausible justifications for at least
some of the Constitution and then investigate the possible influence on interpretive
method. The logical connection to interpretation, if any, ought to show up regardless of
the amount of text that can be justified by the theory.
The caveat is that an authority theory might be more persuasive if the Constitution
must be judged as a whole. Consider good content theories, which may be criticized for
independently judging law’s substance without respect for law’s authority as law. A
Sinatra problem might soften the criticism. Good content theories would be judging the
entire Constitution without the luxury of selecting preferable clauses and freely
discarding others. Or consider stability theories. If the Constitution is still law because
of its coordinating function, then the risks of departure and recoordination are higher if
respect for the text is an all-or-nothing choice. Presumably continued coordination
around the entire text would become more attractive as a theory for why the Constitution
counts as law, compared to a situation in which the stakes are lower and it is easy to pick
and choose which provisions suit us today.
This does bear on my claim that the persuasiveness of an authority theory seems
negatively correlated with its implications for interpretation. That claim depends on a
satisfactory measurement of each authority theory’s persuasiveness, which in turn might
be affected by the presence or absence of a Sinatra problem. Still, the complication
seems mild. The negative correlation claim is untouched unless a Sinatra problem
changes the relative persuasiveness of the various authority theories. It could be that a
Sinatra problem has roughly uniform effects across theories, although there is room for
argument. Either way, the rest of the analysis is unaltered by any Sinatra problem. For
ease of exposition, the discussion will proceed as if the Constitution must be judged as a
whole.
B. Candidate Theories
A prior generation’s t-1 decision cannot bind the current generation at t0 simply
because the first generation said so.144 The t-1 declaration is not a justification for
preferring one generation’s judgment to another, and likewise the Constitution is not
141

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
143
See Michelman, Ida’s Way, supra note 134, at 347–51 (raising questions about unitary judgment).
144
An initial time period is often denoted “t1.” But considering the importance of distinguishing past from
present and future, “t0” will represent the present moment, “t-1” an earlier time, and “t+1” a future time.
142
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authoritative for us because it announces its status as supreme law.145 The following
authority theories try to do better.
1. Brute fact and Hart’s positivism. — The least ambitious authority theories
attempt to define law according to conventional practices and without normatively
evaluating those practices. The best example is Hart’s positivism, which is aggressively
descriptive. He meant his theory to be “morally neutral” in that “it does not seek to
justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in
[his] general account of law.”146
If official acceptance and practice is the test for law, then the Constitution seems
to satisfy it. The document plainly qualifies as valid and enforceable law in the minds
and actions of judges and other government officials, to at least some extent. They
repeatedly refer to it and claim to act in accord with its meaning. The same conclusion
can be drawn from the more general legal or popular culture. These forces help explain
why oaths are still administered to incoming government officials, who swear or affirm
their dedication to support “the Constitution” as a condition of employment.147 In this
and other public ways, officials advertise their willingness to adhere to the federal
constitutional text and warn others about departures. The Charters of Freedom exhibit
could be part of the advertising. One might even regard these ongoing practices as a kind
of mass official consent at every t0. This position is not fixed. It does not imply a lasting
official obligation to treat the text as law or to administer oaths in the future. Assuming
“the people” are divisible across generations, at some t+1 individuals would have to be
free to stop consenting.148 In any case, there is widespread convergence on the written
Constitution’s status as law today, enough to satisfy a descriptive authority theory.149
The question is whether this brute fact has any serious implication for interpretive
method. The answer is no. The extraction of meaning from a document can take place
through any number of interpretive methods without gaining guidance from the conceded
sociological status of the text as law. This is the pattern of various interpretive schools,
anyway. They all claim to respect the text. Originalism is supposed to excavate textual
meaning; moral readings are readings of the text to include references to normative
inquiries; thematic readings are allegedly drawn from the text plus perhaps context, and
used to iron out ambiguities in it; common law constitutional interpretation can be a
process for elaborating textual meaning with reference to past judgments in combination
with right reason; popular constitutionalists may refer to mass judgments on the text’s
correct meaning; and Thayerians attempt to locate decisionmaking authority in a sensible
145

See Schauer, supra note 91, at 152–53.
Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 90, at 240.
147
See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring oath by President); id. art. VI (requiring oath for federal
and state legislators, judges, and executive officers); 4 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (requiring oath for state
officers); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (requiring oath for federal officers); Green, Authority of the State, supra
note 99, at 228 (acknowledging that officials’ oaths may obligate them to obey law); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1448(a) (2000) (requiring an oath for naturalization).
148
Cf. Barnett, supra note 23, at 16 (“[F]or consent to have any meaning, it must be possible to say, ‘I do
not consent’ . . . .”).
149
See generally Schauer, supra note 91, at 147–61. A complication is determining what counts as “the
Constitution.” Even if we concentrate on the text of the document entitled the Constitution of the United
States, there might be disagreement over whether certain alleged amendments were properly ratified.
146
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way without repudiating the obligation to abide by the document’s meaning. True, critics
do not always take proponents at their word. One can dispute whether “interpretation” is
really taking place under these methods and challenge particular readings as departures
from the text. But those challenges gain no strength by reminding the reader that the
Constitution is law. The reader rarely denies that fact.150
Nor are brute fact authority theories justifications for the status quo. They cannot
recommend boundaries on interpretive practice that will sustain the Constitution’s status
as valid law. Descriptive authority theories in particular must be agnostic on this issue.151
Of course the social fact that the Constitution counts as law might impose feasibility
constraints on possible interpretations of the text. Certain interpretations might be so
thoroughly unacceptable to the public or people in power as to be repudiated, or, if
accepted as correct interpretations, occasions for amendment or rejection of the
document. But brute fact theories cannot take a normative position on these possibilities.
This suggests another route by which the brute facts of culture affect
constitutional law. Practical political or cultural pressures might directly constrain the
behavior of constitutional interpreters. Surely many officials who use the text are
sensitive to such forces. But this will not reconnect any authority theory to interpretive
method. First, we are envisioning a direct path from culture to interpretation. It is not
clear that an intervening authority theory for the Constitution as a document does any
work in this scenario.
Furthermore, today’s political and cultural constraints on interpretive method are
at least arguably modest. Official oaths and affirmations are no help. They refer to “the
Constitution,” whatever that means, and apparently not “as interpreted by method x.”152
Nor does any one interpretive method dominate the public or official mind, to the extent
there is any awareness of the options (there is not even great awareness of the plain
text153). Although it would be controversial for the Supreme Court to openly commit to
reading the text in accord with Lutheran doctrine, feasibility constraints will not select
among the prominent interpretive methods described above. Yet moral readings,
originalism, and the others significantly differ in their sources, presumptions, and
attention to precedent. Perhaps the most that can be argued is that some degree of
diversity in interpretive method among public officials is presently sustainable, and might
be a fairly stable equilibrium.154 If true, however, the equilibrium does not recommend
particular interpretive methods. At most it would suggest a system that maintained
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Cf. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 36 (1988) (“[R]ecourse to ‘the Constitution’ as a source of
guidance within our own polity simply begs the question of what counts as ‘the Constitution,’ not to
mention what interpretive guidelines must be followed.”).
151
See supra notes 88–93 (discussing Hart and Kelsen).
152
A conclusion that unfortunately depends on the correct method for interpreting the oath. For one
variation on the debate, see Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 298 (1967) (statements of Sen. Sam
Ervin and attorney Joseph Rauh) (disagreeing over whether Article VI oath should be interpreted to mean
support for the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court).
153
See supra note 77.
154
See infra Part III.B.5.
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interpretive diversity in the political class.155
A brute fact authority theory presents a test for law that the Constitution satisfies
at least in part. The theory checks reality for a sociology that makes full-scale departure
infeasible. This seems to be our situation. But the persuasiveness of brute fact theories
provides no guidance on the kind of interpretive choices that we now face.
2. Good content and Condorcet. — A second theory category is unapologetically
normative and dependent on the goodness of law’s content. The first version of the
theory involves a direct evaluation of content, while the second version applies the
Condorcet Jury Theorem.
a. Authority from goodness. — An early contributor to this school was David
Hume, who denied that the modern state was grounded in a social contract. At one point
Hume indicated that a modern government’s authority could be traced to its societal
benefits, a sense of obligation follows from reflection on “the necessities of human
society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected.”156
Whether or not law’s goodness can be the exclusive test of its authority—and it sounds
nonsensical to assert that everything good is law and every law is good—many believe
such normative evaluations should be a component of the inquiry.157 Good content
theories are certainly compelling at the extremes. Morally optimal law is an outcome to
be thankful for, while a law with catastrophically bad effects should not be and likely will
not be respected for long.
This is not to deny serious problems with content-dependent authority theories.
First, there are as many differences over how law’s content ought to be tested as there are
differences over normative theory in general. Even if a single normative goal is
stipulated, disagreement is bound to occur over the application of a given normative test
to a particular law or legal system.158 Perhaps the strongest (or widest) possible positive
evaluation of the Constitution’s content is an overlapping consensus of various normative
frameworks.159 This is the thrust of Frank Michelman’s recent work on constitutional
legitimacy from a Rawlsian perspective.160 Second, good content theories can be
unambitious and incomplete. Content-dependent theories need not give any weight to
law on account of its enactment; they might make irrelevant the source or process for
creating the legal norm. This may cede important territory to a law’s opponents, making
its authority contingent on subjective evaluations of content.
Nor are unadorned good content theories reliable normative tests for whether to
respect the Constitution. Assuming a Sinatra problem, one must evaluate whether the
155

The analysis might be different close to the time of ratification. A form of originalism is more likely
dictated by politics and culture—and thankfully more feasible to perform.
156
David Hume, Of the Original Contract, reprinted in Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and
Rousseau 145, 160 (Oxford, 1962) (1748); see also id. at 151 (distinguishing ancient tribal associations
“obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes”).
157
See supra note 133.
158
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 10, at 274–81 (highlighting such reasonable
disagreement).
159
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 103, at 133–50, 158–68 (discussing the notion of
overlapping consensus on allegiance to constitutional arrangements).
160
See Michelman, Ida’s Way, supra note 134, at 364–65 (moving away from political contractarian
notions, however, that suggest relatively specified terms with agreed upon meaning).
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document is sufficiently flawed to warrant its total discard. Imagine that the Constitution
as a unit could be graded on a unidimensional scale of zero to ten, with ten meaning
perfect and zero meaning atrocious. Suppose further that the only relevant observer
marks the text with a seven. The question whether to respect the text as law has not been
sensibly resolved. Answering wisely depends on setting a minimum level of
acceptability in light of feasible alternatives.161 Content-dependent theories, to be useful,
should test law against its absence and what might be put in its place. Perhaps a grade
seven constitution should be repudiated because a grade nine constitution can be obtained
with low decision and transition costs; perhaps a grade three constitution should be
respected because transitioning to anything better is infeasible. These issues involve the
comparative virtues of fidelity and innovation, which are the domain of stability theories.
Difficulties would recede if the Constitution were a perfect ten. It would not
really matter who was responsible for the document because there would be no motive to
make changes and no reason to regret the absence of motive. Risks and costs of
transition would be irrelevant. Some Americans have promoted such contentment. A
trace of constitutional perfection might be detected in the patriotism of Felix
Frankfurter162 and more in the assertion of George Sutherland that the Constitution is “a
divinely inspired instrument.”163 Intense admiration for the document has been expressed
more recently by Akhil Amar, whose impressive scholarship is occasionally romantic.
His latest book is entitled America’s Constitution: A Biography and its opening words
are “America’s Constitution beckons . . . .”164
Perfection is not our situation. The written Constitution is imperfect for our time
according to any plausible normative framework. Deep and controversial objections
were noted in Part I, such as that the text establishes a suboptimal form of democracy, but
shallower criticism is probably more devastating to the perfection notion. To note a
dozen troubling details:


the text uses male pronouns to refer to the president, vice president, and members
of Congress, and voting rights do not clearly make women eligible for these
offices;165

161

Cf. Fallon, supra note 96, at 1798 (discussing minimal theories of moral legitimacy).
See Justice Felix Frankfurter, On Being an American, Address for “I Am an American” Day,
Washington, D.C. (May 21, 1944), in Survey Grahpic, July 1944, at 5 (“Love of country like romantic love
is too intimate an emotion to be expressed publicly except in poetry.”). Frankfurter was not simply
worshipping American heritage, however. See id. at 7 (quoting Lincoln: “The dogmas of the quiet past are
inadequate to the stormy present.”).
163
Joel F. Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State 8 (1951).
164
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography xi (2005); see also id. at 5 (comparing
Preamble to wedding vows); Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia x–xii (1966) (lauding
drafters’ judgment). Amar is capable of criticizing the Constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, A
Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, in Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 15, 15
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (arguing that the text’s system for selecting the
president “makes no sense today”).
165
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (referring to representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (senators); id. art. I, § 6,
cl. 2 (members of Congress); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (Vice President); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (discussing presidential
vetoes); id. art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 6–8 (discussing President); id. art. II, §§ 2 & 3 (same); id. amend. XXV, §§ 1,
3–4 (addressing presidential succession and disability); cf. id. amend. XIX (protecting “[t]he right . . . to
vote” of citizens from denial or abridgment on account of sex).
162
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the text mentions an army, a navy, and militias, but not an air force;166



the president must be “a natural born Citizen,” and one reading of the text
excludes everyone alive today from eligibility by requiring citizenship “at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution”;167



Congress may and has set a congressional election day long before members’
terms expire and they regularly legislate as lame ducks;168



the vice president has a plausible textual argument that he may preside at his own
impeachment trial;169



it is not apparent that the President may fire any federal officer subject to Senate
confirmation, especially in light of the impeachment alternative;170



Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 describes how treaties are made but not how, or
whether, the country may withdraw from them;



the First Amendment mentions only the federal legislature and not executive or
judicial conduct, let alone state and local government action;



the Eleventh Amendment’s text shields states from Article III jurisdiction with
respect to suits filed by out-of-state, but not in-state, plaintiffs;171



Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment appears to make importation of alcohol
into a state in violation of state law a violation of the Constitution as well;172



under the Twenty-Third Amendment, residents of the District of Columbia
receive electoral votes but not voting representatives in Congress;



Article V places no explicit limits on the time within which states must ratify
proposed amendments, so we might have a Twenty-Seventh Amendment that was
proposed by the First Congress in 1789 but not even arguably ratified by three

166

See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16; art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. It depends on how one deals with the commas. See Jordan Steiker, Sanford
Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the
Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 243–47 (1995).
168
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (giving Congress power to set time of elections); id. amend. XX, § 1 (setting
January 3 as final day of congressional terms); 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (setting November election day).
169
See Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1341, 1357 n.72 (1983) (noting that Constitution provides for Chief
Justice to preside over President’s impeachment, but contains no similar provision concerning Vice
President).
170
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (providing that “all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office” upon impeachment and conviction for certain misconduct); The Federalist No. 77, at 459
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to
displace as well as to appoint.”). But see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106, 176 (1926)
(invalidating statute restricting President’s power to remove certain officers appointed with advice and
consent of Senate).
171
Contrast the judicial doctrine of state sovereign immunity, which is detached from the Eleventh
Amendment’s text. See Allison Marston Danner & Adam Marcus Samaha, Judicial Oversight in Two
Dimensions: Charting Area and Intensity in the Decisions of Justice Stevens, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2051,
2064–66 (2006).
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See Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying, 12 Const. Comment.
217, 218–19 (1995).
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fourths “of the several States” until 1992.173
Accepting any of these criticisms defeats the perfection claim, and many of them trade on
thin ideological commitments. The flaws, moreover, could easily worsen. If anything,
the pace of change has quickened in the last few centuries and there is cause to expect
that norms suggested by the text will experience more friction with reality.
This leads to the fundamental message about content-dependent theories of
authority: They will not drive interpretive method, even if only one normative
framework is selected. In fact, the logical relationship is in the opposite direction.
Consider the shallow criticisms of the text just listed. Readers will have
wondered whether there are convincing understandings of the Constitution that defeat the
asserted defects. For example, the facial maleness of the document’s pronouns might be
ignored; this was a linguistic practice in the United States for a period of time.174 As
well, the Constitution could be read in light of a continuing practice of accepting women
members of Congress, a contemporary morality that demands this result, a similar spirit
in the Nineteenth Amendment, and insufficient indication that the founding generation
considered the question, whatever their hypothetical expectations.175 Regardless, a
method of interpretation produces information about the Constitution’s meaning, which
enhances one’s ability to make content-dependent judgments.
To that extent,
interpretation is driving authority.176 Indeed there might not be any such thing as preinterpreted constitutional content.
It is true that the Constitution’s content may be normatively evaluated without a
full-blown interpretive method. One might stipulate that the text is written in English and
refrain from more divisive choices. This leaves a spectrum of possible constitutional
meanings to judge together—probably a large range, but not an infinite range. Thus the
Constitution would be judged with certainty that the president must be at least thirty-fiveEarth-years old, with less confidence that a woman is eligible for the office, perhaps even
173

See Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 11 Const. Comment. 101, 102–03 (1994).
174
See Ann Bodine, Androcentrism in Prescriptive Grammar: Singular ‘They’, Sex_Indeterminate ‘He’,
and Androgynous ‘He or She’, 4 Lang. Soc’y 129, 138–41 (1975). The second definition of “he” in a
popular dictionary notes use “when the sex of the person is unspecified.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 534 (10th ed. 1999); cf. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words importing the masculine gender include the
feminine as well . . . .”).
175
The first women to serve in the House and Senate took their posts between 1917 and 1922, respectively,
and the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in between. See Office of History and Preservation, U.S.
House of Representatives, Women in Congress: 1917–2006, H.R. Doc. No. 108-223, at 37, 54–55 (2006)
(noting that Senator Rebecca Felton served for one day). The only judicial treatment I have seen is Bickett
v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418, 432 (N.C. 1915) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (“Under the Constitution of the United
States no one is debarred from holding any office from President down because of sex.”).
176
For similar observations regarding the ability to evaluate the Constitution’s content for purposes of
legitimacy, see Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Authority 148–49 (2005); Fallon, supra note 96,
at 1810 (discussing minimal moral legitimacy); Frank I. Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional
Interpretive Disagreement, in Habermas and Pragmatism 113, 117–18 (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002)
(challenging Rawlsian constitutional contractarianism with pragmatic claims that “norms are not cleanly
separable from their applications”); David A. Strauss, Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1854,
1864–65 (2005) (arguing that legitimacy of Constitution cannot be evaluated without reference to
background understandings about how it is to be interpreted).
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less confidence that we have a Twenty-Seventh Amendment, and so on. But while our
good content theory has become less dependent on information from a stipulated
interpretive method, the price is a less attractive authority theory. Greater uncertainty
about how the Constitution will be interpreted means a less concrete normative
assessment of its content. Resisting informative assumptions about interpretation,
moreover, only prevents the arrow of influence from running strongly from interpretation
to authority theory. It does not establish that a good content theory can drive
interpretation.
Is there any sense in which content-dependent authority theories influence the
proper method of interpretation? The strongest possibility seems to involve moral
readings of the Constitution.177 Consider a moral theorist—egalitarian, libertarian,
utilitarian, cosmopolitan, or whatever—who adopts two commitments: (1) respect a
norm as law only if its content adequately comports with the relevant moral theory and
(2) interpret legal texts to adequately comport with that moral theory. Thus respect for
the Constitution would be conditioned on its moral goodness, and interpretation would be
consciously employed to satisfy this same normative criterion. Randy Barnett and Joseph
Raz take positions close to this combination.178
Yet even here authority is not driving interpretation in a sequential way. The
stumbling block is the role of overarching normative frameworks. If such a commitment
is dictating both an authority theory and an interpretive method, it is not productive to
assert that the theory is influencing interpretation—or, more boldly, that one must first
identify an authority theory before turning to interpretive method. The sequencing
portrayed by the asserted authority/interpretation relationship is absent. Indeed, the
logically prior issue is the clean moral one: the normative standard for desirable conduct.
Where else would a commitment to preserve the Constitution’s moral
acceptability come from? Not from an authority theory. An authority theory is an if/then
proposition that tests for the existence or respect-worthiness of law.179 Alone it cannot
indicate that interpreters should rig their readings to preserve the Constitution’s authority.
Authority theories lack the equipment to impose that directive. Most likely, the
combination of a content-dependent authority theory with a moral reading includes yet
other considerations: the practical necessity of treating the text as enforceable law, the
risks of instability, and the desire for good outcomes.
But now we are essentially following a general directive to do good things, or a
slightly more specific directive to produce good law. Authority theories are unnecessary
for and incapable of such advice. They are designed for a narrower function of defining
and assessing law—even if, like much other conduct, their construction is animated by a
prior and overarching normative commitment. If theories of authority take on more
177

See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
See Barnett, supra note 23, at 49–52, 128–30, 268–69; Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 10,
at 173 (observing that constitutions are validated by practice “[a]s long as they remain within the
boundaries set by moral principles”); see also Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 103, at 52–53 (giving
constructive account of creative interpretation); cf. Fuller, supra note 94, at 82, 91 (intimating that judges
should interpret statutes in an institutionally appropriate fashion—“appropriate to their position in the
whole legal order”—but also to “insure the success” of the legal system).
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See supra Part II.A.
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responsibility, they forfeit their distinctive character, lose any unique leverage on
interpretive method, and begin to descend from the analytical heights to the bare
questions of sound policy.
We cannot hope for textual perfection by any rational measure, and deeper
normative evaluation of the Constitution takes into account how the document is
interpreted. A good content theory does not itself present a method of textual
interpretation, although a moral reading is not a surprising companion once an additional
reason is given for valuing the Constitution’s retention. None of this supposes an
analytical sequence by which the question of authority is first answered and only then
may attention turn to interpretive method.
b. Condorcet and the Constitution. — Some will resist freeform normative
evaluation of the Constitution and yet desire a content-related test for its authority. It has
been suggested that past generations of constitutional decisionmakers were exceptionally
adept as well as public spirited, particularly the founding generation, and that we should
trust their judgment. If so, these t-1 decisionmakers could qualify as practical authorities
on good behavior, whose decisions about constitutional law should be respected and not
disrupted by creative interpretation in t0.
On these conditions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) becomes attractive. It is
the mathematical companion to recent interest in the reliability of mass judgments.180
Condorcet and his followers demonstrate that the majority judgment of large groups may
be vastly more accurate than smaller groups. Assume that a yes-or-no proposition with a
correct answer is at issue and that the average voter has a 60% chance of judging the
proposition correctly. With a few additional assumptions, the probability that the
majority of these voters are correct increases as the number of voters increases. Thus the
majority of three such voters is nearly 65% likely to be correct and for forty-one voters
the likelihood is over 90%.181
Application of CJT to the Constitution is fairly straightforward.182 The question
under a content-dependent authority theory is whether the document’s substance is good
enough to respect. Part of the founding generation decided whether the Philadelphia draft
was superior to the Articles of Confederation, and subsequent decisionmakers judged
whether proposed amendments were superior to the document as it then stood. At least
some of the participants were attempting to judge what would be best for their posterity
180

See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy ch. 5 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How
Many Minds Produce Knowledge 25–38 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Infotopia]; James Surowiecki, The
Wisdom of Crowds __ (2004) (“With most things, the average is mediocrity. With decision making, it’s
often excellence.”).
181
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 10, at 135 & n.43. Increases also can be achieved by
enhancing the accuracy of voters; and the Theorem can hold if the mean accuracy of the voters is over 50%
even if some fall below that level. See also Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy:
Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. Pol. Phil. 277, 283–87 (2001) (applying dynamic to more
than two options, where mean voter is more likely to select correct option than any other option).
182
A recent related argument is that the original Constitution is entitled to respect because it was ratified by
supermajority voting rules. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 30. A critical response is Ethan J.
Lieb, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and
Non-Originalists, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 113, 116–22 (2007) (relying in part on time lapses and
circumstance changes).
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as well as themselves. One application of CJT is to respect these past judgments, which
could have significant logical implications for interpretive method. If the Constitution is
authoritative for us because we trust the judgment of past drafters and ratifiers, an
interpreter might parlay that trust into some sort of quest for how those past generations
understood the text they were making. Again, institutional and empirical considerations
might intervene to soften or foreclose originalism, but hold those objections aside.
Unfortunately the premises for Condorcetian confidence are lacking. This is true
even if CJT applies to normative and not only fact questions, we ignore voting rights
limitations, and we refrain from interpreting the decisions of many or most eligible voters
not to participate in the election of delegates for state ratifying conventions.183 The
Theorem demands that (1) each voter answer the same question and hence does not
answer questions such as “is the Constitution good?” according to individualized
personal preferences,184 (2) the mean accuracy of all voters is better than random—for
instance, greater than 50% for binary choices,185 (3) voters make judgments independent
of the votes of others, such that strategic voting and cascades do not become problems.186
The first hindrance is that past generations answered questions different from the
one before us. The founding generation chose the original version of the text over the
status quo, which might have been perfectly correct and might have attempted to take the
well-being of future generations into account. But the current generation might applaud
the founding generation’s choice as of t-1 without deciding to ignore the new setting at t0.
We understand the text’s imperfections better today than the original drafters and
ratifiers. Adding subsequent generations who successfully amended the text via Article
V does not solve the problem. Each of those decisions that amendment constituted
improvement could be normatively correct without answering whether departure or
fidelity at t0 is best. At best, past generations asked whether the text was good enough for
their generation in addition to ours. That is not the practical question we face.
These concerns are linked to the second CJT condition, involving mean voter
accuracy. Even if adequate numbers of t-1 drafters and ratifiers were voting on our wellbeing and even if we can sensibly pose this question without a concrete alternative to the
current Constitution, it is not clear that their accuracy on that question is better than a
183

On the historical record regarding voter eligibility and turnout for elections to the Article VII ratifying
conventions, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 475,
563–65 & nn. 255–256 (1995).
184
See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 10, at 134 (distinguishing every legislator asking what
is best for everyone from each legislator asking what is best for his district). For less stringency, see
Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 567, 570–72 (1988) (noting that individual preferences may cancel out); and Krishna K. Ladha, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 617, 629 (1992)
(explaining that addition of less-than-random accuracy voters sometimes improves group performance if
their biases are negatively correlated with majority’s).
185
For exceptions involving small groups, see Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld,
Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 Theory & Decision 261, 271 (1983) (indicating that meanvoter and majority-vote accuracy are not always both above or both below 50%).
186
See Sunstein, Infotopia, supra note 180, at 88–92 (discussing informational and reputational cascades in
deliberation); Grofman et al., supra note 185, at 273–74 (calculating opinion-leader problems).
Nonindependent votes just should not be tallied; they do not destroy the value of independent votes. Nor
does “independent” forbid deliberation; the problem is simply following others.
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random guess. Most of the text is over two hundred years old. The founding generation
achieved a remarkable political compromise but they were not omniscient. Their leaders
did not fully foresee the development and consequences of national political parties, for
example, an event that took place within their own lifetimes.187 And if they were
systematically biased or their normative values are no longer held (consider the mix of
views on slavery, women’s rights, and state power), their mean accuracy on our wellbeing is less than 50%. If so, CJT magnifies the inaccuracy of their aggregated votes.188
A different use of CJT takes much more recent conduct for its “votes.” One could
look to the current generation for indications of support for the Constitution. This gets
closer to the relevant question today, it takes advantage of contemporary knowledge, and
perhaps we can trust (some subset of) today’s population to make a judgment better than
random. But this option is obstructed. It runs into the third condition for Condorcetian
confidence in the majority because contemporary expressions of support are not always
independent in the way the Theorem demands. This is a ramification of cultural
constraints on change.189 The more the t0 population worships and defers to the judgment
of past generations, the less likely the independent-judgment condition is satisfied.190
Most important, the presentist application of CJT has the weakest of implications
for interpretive method. Even if every condition of the Theorem is satisfied, one can only
be confident that the Constitution as now written is appropriately respected as
enforceable law in our time. If this suggests interpreters of the Constitution should ask
these contemporary “voters” exactly what they believe they were validating, we are
basically asking ourselves what we think the document means. This is not a guide for
interpretation. It is a license to choose—and independently at that.
3. Contractarianism and incentives. — Yet another line of theory turns away
from law’s content and looks to the potential moral significance of past commitments.
These social contract or precommitment theories instead might be animated by ex ante
justifications, which are also addressed below.
a. Social contracts and precommitment models. — In contrast to Hume’s
arguments from good consequences, theorists such as John Locke sought to justify the
authority of law on consent of the governed, bounded by natural right and justice.191
Consent can be a potent content-independent theory. One might believe consent
enhances the accuracy of authority determinations or rightly respects human autonomy.
187

See Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of
Presidential Democracy 5–6 (2005). It might be that t-1 decisionmaker ignorance or forecasting errors put
them behind the veil such that their judgment is not biased in the way that ours now is. But this reduces
their presumed average accuracy, as well, and the implication of the trade-off is unclear. Should we prefer
our degree of bias or their degree of incompetence?
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The Article V version of supermajority voting would appear to reduce false positives (erroneous
judgments that the text should be amended) and increase false negatives (erroneous judgments that the text
should not be amended). A CJT proponent would want an argument for why this tilt makes sense.
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See supra Part I.C.
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See Adrian Vermeule, Common-Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 Colum. L. Rev.
1482, 1498 (2007) (identifying this “Burkean paradox”). Vermeule suggests the written Constitution’s
ratifiers may compare favorably to the judgment of contemporary judges, but he does not appear to vouch
for the reliability of either. See id. at 1503–06.
191
See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government,
reprinted in Social Contract, supra note 156, at 1, 56–58, 70–84.
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And social contractarian theory has a history of application to the Constitution. Elements
of it are present in Federalist 78 and Marbury v. Madison, which were written relatively
close in time to the original ratification. Arguing for the supremacy of the document over
ordinary statutes, John Marshall referred to the “original right” of “the people” to
establish principles for their future government,192 and Alexander Hamilton invoked the
will of “the people, declared in the Constitution.”193
Of course not every member of the political community expressly, let alone
“voluntarily,” has consented to support the document as enforceable law. A contractarian
authority theory requires renovation if it is to survive. But, if persuasive, it could have
serious implications for interpretive method. It might well suggest reliance on the
ratifying generation’s views about the text’s meaning, or at least their preferred method
for ascertaining meaning.194 A modern cousin of contractarian theories is the notion of
precommitment or self-binding, and federal constitutional law is regularly gilded with it.
Precommitment is almost invariably illustrated with the story of Ulysses
(Odysseus) and the Sirens.195 Ulysses clogged the ears of his crew with wax so they
would not respond to songs of the deadly Sirens, but ordered himself bound to the mast
so he could enjoy them without physical power to stray from his predetermined course.
Assuming his initial t–1 preference ought to have been satisfied, Ulysses’ preselected
constraint on his t0 freedom would achieve a superior outcome in t+1. Scholars have since
identified several justifications and devices for self-binding.196 Ulysses’ rational self
eliminated options to combat his passionate urges, akin to an addict avoiding social
settings that cue dangerous behavior. Another motivation is preventing effectuation of
preference shifts due to hyperbolic discounting, as when a penalty for early withdrawal
helps the depositor save for a big-ticket item at the end of the year. A third motivation is
strategic. Promises and threats can be made more credible to third parties with a reliable
precommitment, as when contracts are enforceable in court.
Each of these ideas probably resembles a piece of federal constitutional law but
the precommitment model is unsalvageable here. Key flaws have been identified by a
leading investigator of precommitment, Jon Elster. One snag he identifies is the
character of particular constitutional provisions: Some are best viewed as a majority
192

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
The Federalist No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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I do not take a position on the best rendering of interpretive method at the various times when the text
was ratified. On interpretation at the founding, compare the connection to common law reasoning in H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 889, 894–902
(1985), with the assertion of some anticipated invariant meaning and settlement by practice in Caleb
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 523–39 (2003).
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See Homer, The Odyssey Book XII, at 148, 151–52 (Samuel Butler trans., E.P. Dutton & Co., 1925)
(1900). An influential scholarly use is Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and
Irrationality (1979). More recent uses of the imagery include Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the
Constitutional Order, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 475, 476 (2006), and Boudreaux & Prichard, supra note 52, at
123.
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See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints ch. 2 (2000)
[hereinafter Elster, Ulysses Unbound]; Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some
Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1754–57 (2003) [hereinafter
Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge] (discussing interest, passion, and reason as different motives for action
and explaining how foreseeable shifts in motivation can justify precommitment).
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preference entrenched against minority opposition, perhaps with anticipation that the
minority would become a sustained majority in the future.197 Elster indicates that the
Philadelphia Convention’s compromises over slavery amounted to this kind of
distributional choice and political haggle.198 Such events fit poorly with the idea of a
rational actor constraining her choices against short-term passion or interest.
Jeremy Waldron presents a related objection. Constitutional provisions often
incorporate contestable moral questions.199 Everyone in the country might justifiably
agree that searches should not be “unreasonable” and bearing arms should be a “right,”
yet disagree over the specific content of those commitments. Equally important, time
changes norms, circumstances, and available information. When the time comes to apply
constitutional commitments, often there will be reasonable disagreement over the proper
outcome, even with unanimous agreement on a general principle. Prioritizing a past
majority’s t-1 judgment and then calling it precommitment against irrational urges can
unfairly insult the current majority operating in t0. They might be acting rationally with
the most generous of public spirit, and better information. Nor is it obvious that
constitutional drafting happens in situations where highbrow rationality dominates the
forces of passion and narrow self-interest. New constitutions usually mark serious
regime change and often in revolutionary ages. Peter drunk—and now dead—might be
issuing commands to Peter sober.200
This leads to the most fundamental problems: identifying any plausible “self”
whose plans are “binding” over time, especially across generations. As for bindingness,
the social construction claim in dead hand complaints challenges the ability of t-1 to truly
govern t0. If the persistence of an arrangement established in t-1 depends only on
discretion in t0, then the precommitment model is inapposite. The model involves
practical impact on choices. This is what made the concept intriguing. Applauding the
victory of past preferences over current desires deepened our understanding and
evaluation of human freedom. Uninterrupted freedom to choose from unbounded sets
can be injurious. Removing the binding destroys the concept. Insofar as “there is
nothing external to society,” Elster observes, constitutions are unlike situations in which
“the individual can . . . entrust his will to external institutions or forces, outside his
control, that literally make it impossible for him to change his mind.”201
There actually are mechanisms for a nation to effectively constrain future policy
choices. We have already reviewed the possibility of path dependence in politics. And
197

See Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge, supra note 196, at 1757–61.
See id. at 1761.
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See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 10, at 268–75. The problem of commitment to
contestable moral answers might be self-correcting. Intergenerational commitments that chafe might
undercut a future generation’s willingness to define their political community to include the past, or might
encourage selective use of history in ways that mock precommitment. In any case, it should be understood
that Waldron is not demanding unmitigated presentism. His preference for majoritarian democracy
requires selection of a community both geographic and temporal.
See id. (warning against
intergenerational commitment, nevertheless).
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See Elster, Ulysses Unbound, supra note 196, at 159; Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 706 (1995).
201
Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge, supra note 196, at 1759–60 (emphasis omitted) (asserting that device of
increasing costs is not available to collectives; noting that strategies of deleting options and delaying
choices operate differently with respect to individuals and groups).
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one nation might make assurances to others via its constitution. We can regard Article
VI’s declared commitment to treaty obligations as an instrument of foreign relations,202
or clauses restricting expropriation of property as tools for attracting foreign
investment.203 Governments that offer such external assurances may later face pressure
from other nations or nongovernmental organizations when a departure is contemplated.
But even if national decisions at t-1 can have binding force at t0, the problem of
“self” seems intractable. The people responsible for the bulk of the constitutional text are
dead. If they found a way to bind themselves to these arrangements, the question today
regards constraints on a completely new population.204 Whether we should be thankful
and treat it as “our” precommitment is another question; many people do better when
others choose for them, if for no other reason than the savings in decision costs, and
continuing to treat the Constitution as law might close off troubling strategic behavior.205
But these are separate defenses of cross-generational arrangements that do not fit the
precommitment analogy.206 Another way of testing the analogy is to ask whether it
makes a difference to the text’s authority that someone can or cannot trace their family
heritage to members of a generation during which a ratification took place. Does such a
genealogical connection to ratification make the constitutional text more “yours”? It is
hard to see why it should. Any confidence that the Constitution ought to be enforceable
law does not depend on one’s heritage as a recent immigrant or a Daughter of the
American Revolution.
Of course the intergenerational objection can be defused by erasing distinctions
among generations. This is not far from Rubenfeld’s position. He maintains that “selfgovernment” must be seen as a multigenerational project to understand and perpetuate the
system. Although part of the argument rests on a critique of persons behaving like
impetuous consumers with no sense of past and too few long-term commitments,207 the
theoretical assertion is that the Constitution’s authority follows from the present
generation’s obligation to collaborate with people from t-1. “If the Constitution
legitimately binds us today, it does so insofar as we are members of the same people that
gave itself this law.”208 Rubenfeld defines “a people” for this purpose abstractly as a set
of persons who now exist or existed in the past “under the rule of a particular political-
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See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (referring to treaties as supreme law); Max Farrand, The Framing of the
Constitution of the United States 46–47 (1913) (describing a “pitiable spectacle” in which U.S. states could
flout treaties).
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Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. L. Studies 83, 94–97 (2002) (exploring rights enforcement
and judicial independence as comforting signals to foreign investors).
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See Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge, supra note 196, at 1758.
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See id. at 1761.
206
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 23, ch. 1 (demanding individualized voluntary consent or adequate
assurance of just outcomes). Consider Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic
Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 Tex. L.
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See Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government 5, 116–24, 143–
44 (2001) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time].
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Rubenfeld, Legitimacy and Interpretation, supra note 127, at 215; see also Kronman, supra note 66, at
1064–68 (asserting content-independent duty to nurture past undertakings).
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legal order.”209 Without doubt, certain people feel better and behave in socially
beneficial ways when they think of themselves as connected to a group or national
history, and as contributing to its improvement. Whether or not this attitude is popular
with academics, it is felt deeply by many.
True as that may be, generational collapse is neither universally experienced nor
indisputably good. Certainly it is not necessary for today’s population to mesh their
identity with the achievements and mistakes of the past, any more than it is necessary for
adults to root for the same sports team as their great-grandparents. This is fortunate. Too
much respect for ancient arrangements hinders our ability to separate good efforts from
bad, and Rubenfeld himself is open to considering the entire sweep of constitutional
development over time.210 The living ought to be discriminating in their look back. They
may achieve excellent results for t0 and t+1 by not following every trajectory mapped out
in t-1. And so the conceptual possibility of a multigenerational people is no argument for
adopting the thought.211
Nor will a conceptual collapse of generations resurrect the precommitment model
for constitutional law. Insofar as the argument recommends that we adopt an attitude of
respect for tradition and past effort as a way of achieving socially desirable outcomes, it
is not a surrender to self-binding but rather a presentist justification for respecting the
past. Such a recommendation avoids the puzzles of how to treat newcomers to the United
States; and whether a centuries-old “People” of contested membership, character, and
duration can be fused with today’s population, at least without serious discretion in the
present.212 But it is not precommitment. It is an exhortation to feel bound in t0 so as to
achieve a healthy balance of freedom and constraint over the long run.213 If this
recommendation is attractive, moreover, it is difficult to find practical guidance for
interpretation. The commitments of the past would be watered down by the norms and
circumstances of the present. Rubenfeld’s vision of constitutional adjudication indicates
as much. It operates on contemporary judgments about paradigm cases, selected out
from t-1 by people in t0.
This skeptical assessment of contractarian authority theories should be open to
revision. Part of the critique’s force derives from an assumption, sometimes hidden, that
jurisdictional exit is difficult. When exit is impractical or a morally problematic
imposition, there may be a compensating desire to enhance the voice of people within a
political community.214 Constraining them with dated constitutional bargains might seem
intolerable. But the costs and opportunities for international migration are not static.
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Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time, supra note 207, at 153–54. Rubenfeld distinguishes his idea of a people
from uniformity of thought and homogenizing nationalism, see id. at 145–52, 154, and he accepts that there
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Transportation technology has been driving down the price of relocation for many
decades; communications technology is making geographic proximity less crucial for
thick human relationships; and globalizing forces could partly homogenize cultures
without eviscerating differences in legal systems. Of course cultural divides and
location-specific human capital often restrict nation-hopping to economic and other
necessity. Still, these frictions are not stable. Consent to national law would be even
easier to accept if members were well-informed about alternatives; perhaps a subsidized
international Rumspringa is in order.215 Today’s option set is quite different, however,
and contractarian theories of constitutional authority are vulnerable for the time being.
b. Forward-looking incentives. — A final thought involves incentives for
political mobilization. This is not a well-developed theory of authority for our
Constitution, but the argument would be that treating the existing text as law respects the
ratification victories of the past. And respecting those victories in our time might create
desirable incentives for present-day actors to achieve similar victories.216 Article V
victories become special in that they are bundled with longevity. Those who successfully
navigate the arduous process of formal amendment retain that achievement unless an
equally powerful political force survives the same process. In this way proponents of
textual fidelity can offer a fully presentist justification for the text’s authority, one that
suggests an originalist interpretive method as strongly as any other theory.
Such incentive-based reasoning is standard in law and economics and it has been
employed to fend off other dead hand complaints. For example, a degree of respect for
the dead authors of wills and trusts can be defended on the basis of forward-looking
incentives, rather than an emotional attachment to the deceased or the awkward belief
that the dead themselves have rights against the living.217 Respecting testamentary
documents signals their efficacy to the living and adds value to property. There may be
objections but the dynamic is understandable. And constitutional text tends to have a
safeguard that wills lack: the drafters and ratifiers presumably live under the text before
passing away.
Although an incentives approach might be stronger than other contractarian
efforts, it suffers from serious weaknesses. The first is that one must adore the actual
Article V process to make the theory persuasive. The incentives such fidelity creates are
hitched to the quirks of Article V. Its brand of supermajority lawmaking slants toward
small population states, both in Congress’s role and in the role of state legislatures or
conventions. Privileging states as states might be good or bad, but the slant is at least
215
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Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 808–22 (2005) (discussing right to destroy as necessary to stimulate creation
when viewed from ex ante perspective).
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debatable and in tension with modern nationalist trends. One can sensibly prefer, say, a
national plebiscite or two for formal amendment. True, the best answer for any one
jurisdiction is partly clouded by empirical uncertainty and contested value choices, as
discussed above.218 But here, uncertainty is insufficient. The incentives argument
requires dedication to a program that affirmatively promotes Article V lawmaking.
The second weakness is equally problematic. There is no apparent theory for the
optimal duration of Article V victories, partly because there is no consensus account of
the value of such political mobilization. Even if that value can be stipulated, how
powerful should the incentives be? Did Article V somehow obtain the right balance?
What if supreme constitutional norms formally expired after fifty years? One hundred?
The issue resembles an economist’s struggle to determine an optimal patent term.219
Entrenchment creates trade-offs. Only a particular (perhaps peculiar) theory of
democracy confirms Article V as a process for legal change that ought to be encouraged
and that provides the appropriate amount of encouragement.
4. Stability as coordination and tradition. — A final group of theories is perhaps
less optimistic about the uses of a constitution. These theories demand consideration of
stability’s virtues and innovation’s vices. But unlike brute fact theories, stability theories
offer a normative justification for the persistence of multigenerational arrangements.
Burke is commonly used as the avatar of regime stability,220 but others including Hume221
and even Jefferson noted its value. “[M]oderate imperfections had better be borne with,”
Jefferson once wrote, “because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them,
and find practical means of correcting their ill effects.”222
There is no need to rely on a mystical respect for the work of past generations. In
fact, the age of an arrangement is not necessarily relevant. Modern argument for
constitutions as solutions to a pure coordination game223 or a (badly named) battle of the
sexes224 does not turn on the text’s age. In the former, participants are indifferent to the
outcome within a set of options but they do prefer to coordinate on the same option. The
perennial example is driving on the left or right side of the road. In battle of the sexes
games, participants have different preferences but none stronger than the desire to agree
on the same option. In either game, a salient focal point might resolve the matter without
a claim to optimality in any other sense. Thomas Schelling’s memorable example was a
decision about where and when to meet in New York City. Because the participants
could not communicate and had one shot to select a location and time of day, and because
218

See supra Part I.B.
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See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 41–42 (1994)
(describing hypothetical version of game in which man and woman have differing, and perhaps
stereotypical, preferences for their leisure time).
219

Forthcoming in 108 Columbia Law Review
Draft of 12/30/2007

47

the set of possible choices was so large, a meeting might seem hopeless. But an outright
majority of Schelling’s New Haven respondents chose Grand Central Station and another
large majority chose noon.225 However arbitrary, salient choices prevailed when the goal
was a given.
A force that moves people into these congenial game theoretic models—which
work poorly for issues like abortion policy—is uncertainty. The inability to predict the
consequences of different options pushes decisionmaking toward reasonably
ascertainable variables. Often enough, predictable decision costs and transition costs will
outrun less-certain net benefits from one option over another.226 The option selected
becomes less important than ending the decisionmaking process expeditiously.
In addition, stability theories help complete good content theories of authority.
They point to the dangers of transition. Of course stability is not always possible or
better than change; we need a normative framework to help judge the trade-offs. But
decision costs, transition costs, and the risks of failing to recoordinate on a better
arrangement should be recognized in t0 regardless of when or how the current
arrangement got started. Indeed there may be justice in maintaining coordination around
a basically good legal system. Refusals to comply with a generally just system can be a
form of free riding, may encourage others to stop coordinating within the system, and
could result in the system unraveling.227 As well, stability theories have the potential
advantage of relative content-independence. They speak to audiences unconvinced of the
value of law’s content standing alone. And unlike contractarian theories, David Strauss
has observed, stability theories age well.228 They are everlasting presentist arguments for
respecting certain legal arrangements that survive into t0.
Stability theories seem like fitting justifications for treating the Constitution as
enforceable law. Indeed, recent empirical work in political science and economics
suggests that many constitutional design choices do not significantly affect measurable
aspects of human well-being.229 It has been difficult, for instance, to demonstrate an
advantage for either democracy or dictatorship in producing economic growth.230
Tinkering within the democratic category is probably less likely to change per capita
GDP.231 In fact, a host of constitutional design choices are subject to serious uncertainty
225
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regarding their influence on any number of outcomes. To take just one additional
example, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the policy or power-related consequences of
invalidating one House legislative vetoes232—let alone whether any consequence was an
improvement over the status quo ante.
This is not to suggest that our Constitution is irrelevant or that conceivable
changes would not produce better results. Amartya Sen has claimed that no famine has
occurred in a multiparty democracy with elections and a free media.233 People might live
longer or healthier lives in democracies,234 and perhaps respecting a written constitutional
text with basic democratic features is conducive to that outcome. Protecting property
rights, contracts, and other market elements has been associated with economic wellbeing,235 and constitutional judicial review might help.236 Moreover, certain rights
provisions or democratic forms might have intrinsic value. But there is much
constitutional territory in which the effect of fidelity or departure is not safely
predictable. Furthermore, if there is a Sinatra problem, we cannot separate textual
provisions worthy of respect from those that are not. The entire text would have to be
respected to at least a degree. Hence the text’s greatest virtue may be its ability to initiate
basic institutions and reduce decision costs on choices that do not matter much.
The critical issue for present purposes is the relationship between stability
theories and interpretive method. It has been suggested that coordination and affiliated
theories confine textual interpretation by recommending conventional readings.237 By
doing so, an interpreter acts consistently with the benefits of coordination. Furthermore,
a shocking interpretation of any part of the text might have far-reaching impact.
Observers could become uncertain about the meaning of the entire document as soon as
surprising results become salient.
This uncertainty might even jeopardize the
Constitution’s enforceability. Some claim that popular support is the ultimate test for
constitutional longevity and that a constitutional text can be self-enforcing: A
GDP from more centralized democratic arrangements). For an attempt to link self-reported life-satisfaction
scores to direct democracy in Swiss cantons, see Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness and Economics
136–50 (2002).
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Statutes, 26 Polity 677, 677–80, 687–96 (1994) (finding no post-Chadha influence on policy outcomes or
balance power between branches in education policy, although claiming Congress stabilized certain
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sufficiently precise text can make transgressions relatively easy to identify, and the
document can become a focal point for coordinating popular support of textual
constraints.238 This possibility begins to disappear as the variance in plausible
interpretations increases.
This is all true but the relationship to interpretation is actually attenuated. The
first complication was discussed in relation to good content theories.239 Strictly speaking,
an authority theory is supposed to test for the presence of (respect-worthy) law without
taking a more controversial position on how much law there ought to be. If the
Constitution is adequately serving a coordination function, then a stability theory will see
a respectable law. It takes an additional normative commitment to want the document to
continue that function, and thus to impose conventionalist restraints on interpretation. At
this point, however, it seems that a more general norm is influencing both authority and
interpretation. A global stability value need not operate through an authority theory that
filters sources of law, and only then apply to interpretive method. The analytic sequence
would be unnecessary. In fact it is quite possible that a constitutional stability theorist
will accept a degree of respect for the Constitution as a side constraint, rather than a
polestar, for interpretation.
Even if this concern gives too little credit to authority theories, the implications
for interpretive method are still limited. Most important, many stable methods of
interpretation should deliver coordination-related benefits. The described threat to
coordination around the Constitution is variance in predicted interpretive outcomes. But
variance can be reduced in a number of ways. Uncertainty about the Constitution’s
meaning can be reduced by assurance that an originalist inquiry will take place, or that a
moral reading will be conducted, or that judicial precedent will be taken as given, or that
ambiguous provisions will be read in light of a theme such as deliberative democracy. To
be sure, sufficiently outrageous interpretive outcomes threaten the coordination function.
Declaring that fidelity to the Constitution requires severe wealth redistribution or
secularization of civil society would jeopardize coordination around the text in 2007.
This practical truth exerts a degree of constraint on interpretation for those who are
already committed to promoting stability, and it suggests that stability theories are not
wholly content-independent in operation. Nevertheless, the debate over appropriate
interpretive method today retains many choices within the range of reasonable
disagreement. Coordination theories are not very useful in selecting among these
candidate methods.
To put it another way, stability is a value involving the pace of change and not
necessarily its direction. Interpretive method can slowly migrate in many possible
directions without undermining the Constitution’s focal status. Creeping originalism or
creeping moralism would be equally acceptable. This conclusion is reinforced when
legal advice is widely available and the anticipated conduct of a single institution, namely
the Supreme Court, is also a focal point for coordination on textual meaning. Expert
advice and Court supremacy facilitate the quick settlement of constitutional disputes.
These resolutions might be normatively suboptimal, but that is not the concern of stability
238
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theories. They are designed for just such occasions by providing reasons to accept
imperfection. As long as a stability theory is able to accommodate some change, the
direction of that change is not determined by the theory. Changes in interpretive method
would be slowed without being guided.
Furthermore, once an interpreter is committed to stability as a general norm, the
Constitution becomes only one source to respect. It is at most one point in a constellation
of provisional social settlements. Interpreters of this particular text presumably would
not want to dislodge arrangements that have built up alongside—and perhaps contrary
to—the best rendering of the text’s meaning. Take Barry Weingast’s scholarship on selfenforcing constitutions.240 His claim is that written constitutions can provide a focal
point for citizens to make judgments about government transgressions. Competing forces
in society may enter into pacts for mutual advantage, and these pacts might be selfenforcing if reflected in a text.241 Setting aside normative objections to these equilibria,
Weingast’s examples from U.S. history are revealing. He points to various compromises
over slavery and conflicting sectional interests that stitched together an operative federal
government from the founding until the Civil War.242 But these compromises were only
partly reflected in constitutional text; they were also instantiated through statute and less
formal conventions. This is a reminder that the Constitution is a small part of the status
quo, and that valuing stability may justify that document’s continuing status as law
without saying much specific about its interpretation. Any societal equilibrium is likely
to be multi-sourced.
The importance of sources beyond the Constitution leads to a closing remark.
There is another facet to the common law method, one that claims wisdom deeper than
simple conservatism. The notion is that the process of reviewing, respecting, yet
sometimes revising precedent through contemporary reason will accumulate knowledge
across generations without locking in features of law that can no longer be defended.243
Here the avatar is Hayek as much as Burke: the argument is optimistic and progressive.
Even if we cannot fully understand the rationale for a tradition embodied in an institution,
“the evolutionary view is based on the insight that the result of the experimentation of
many generations may embody more experience than any one man possesses.”244 Those
240
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more willing to interrogate tradition or precedent with contemporary reason may still
reward longevity with some respect.245 This argument is, like coordination theories,
content independent but it does depend on a long-standing arrangement.
However persuasive,246 this assessment of common law reasoning is at most
tangentially related to the authority of the Constitution. The advocated method has no
strong reason to prefer the written Constitution to certain contemporary statutes, or even
the views of expert executive officials. The Constitution is at best one source of wisdom
and any guidance on how to read that source is not obvious. As Strauss puts it, “our
written constitution has, by now, become part of an evolutionary common law
system.”247 Here the appropriate relationship among multiple sources of law is rising to
the surface, and a unidirectional relationship between authority and interpretation of
respective sources is fading.
5. Postmodern unsettlement. — There is, finally, a postmodern perspective on
authority and interpretation. Mike Seidman ingeniously explores the possibility that
respect for the Constitution might be justified by unsettlement rather than certainty.248
The idea is that the text is open to differing, even diametrically opposed, readings and has
been used to validate very different goals over time. This openness preserves the
possibility of unsettling any constitutional order, however resilient current arrangements
might seem. Hope for the vanquished comes from the possibility of the worm turning.
“Political community is maintained precisely because there is no permanent settlement
and, indeed, no exclusive, agreed-upon method for amending temporary settlements.”249
Unsettlement theory has attributes of stability arguments but is fueled by indeterminacy.
Some of the unsettlement argument seems true as a descriptive matter. Often in
American history constitutional text remained stable while its interpretation and the
structure of our government did not. And the Constitution obviously is a revered cultural
icon appropriated by many different ideological movements. But even assuming positive
unifying effects from the situation, no one should blinker the decision costs associated
with interpretive openness combined with supremacy. The opportunity for altering
supreme law through shifting interpretation makes constitutional argument all the more
attractive. At least some and perhaps most of the territory covered by the written
Constitution is not worth fighting over, beyond short-term distributive consequences.
245

See Brown, Tradition and Insight, supra note 67, at 180 (rejecting as too extreme attempts to ignore
lessons that might be drawn from history); Strauss, Common Law, supra note 11, at 891–97 (explaining
that rational common law adjudication avoids blind obedience to past yet proceeds with humility).
246
Cf. supra Part III.B.2 (skeptically reviewing application of Condorcet Jury Theorem to Constitution). A
concern with deference to tradition is the ex ante incentive to attack novel practices as soon as possible,
before much information about the consequences of the practice can be obtained. Knowing that a practice
may become entrenched at t+1 can encourage t0 challenges.
247
Strauss, Common Law, supra note 11, at 885 (emphasis added); cf. Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting
the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication 81, 86 (1990) (linking courtidentified principles to text but stating such principles “have a life of their own”).
248
See Seidman, supra note 106, at 210–16; see also Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman
and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 485, 493–94 (2004) (emphasizing interpretive openness
and discourse values); supra note 160 (referencing overlapping consensus).
249
Seidman, supra note 106, at 55. Seidman assumes a background of relative political indifference,
economic wealth, and cultural solidarity. And he is battling some sort of entrenched settlement via
constitutionalism rather than ordinary law. See id. at 54–58, 62.

Forthcoming in 108 Columbia Law Review
Draft of 12/30/2007

52

More important, the actual interpretive advice from an unsettlement theory is
challenging to operationalize. What should an individual interpreter do when faced with
a constitutional argument? In the unsettlement model, rights claims are supposed to be
indeterminate.250 Should there be an institutional mechanism for assuring a plurality of
interpretive perspectives at any given point in time, or perhaps shifting methods from
time to time? Such a mechanism seems to qualify as a constitutional settlement
forbidden by the theory, as Seidman wonders.251 Possibly unsettlement theories are less
recommendations than observations about the dynamics of constitutional law.252
Whatever insight is delivered, however, offers little advice on interpretive method.
IV. THE INTERPRETATION CONNECTION REVISITED
The logical relationship between authority theories and interpretive method is not
as reliable as the assertion with which we began, at least not for the Constitution.
Combinations of multiple authority theories only make the relationship to interpretation
more complex. There is no good reason to exhaust the possibilities here; we have not
even enumerated every conceivable theory or possible component of a robust interpretive
method. Instead this Part collects lessons from the analysis, offers an explanation for the
emergence of the asserted relationship that has been critiqued, and briefly reconstructs
the connection between interpretation and authority in a broader frame—emphasizing
norms, decisionmaking, and institutional factors. In fact the greatest significance of
authority theories for interpretive practice might be in modulating the strength of
competing sources of law. In this way, authority theorizing might be redeemed.
A. Lessons
Dead hand complaints remind us that positive law needs our complicity to survive
and they demand a defense of the status quo. Authority theories offer responses and they
influence interpretation in an undeniable way: They select targets for a decisionmaker’s
interpretation by identifying what counts as law. To the extent an authority theory
highlights benefits from respecting some source of law—and not every theory has this
purpose—decisionmakers might prefer to avoid warring against those benefits. But this
suggests an additional normative commitment and, regardless, the logical relationship
between authority theories and interpretive method is vacillating and contingent.
Assertions and conclusions about this relationship are summarized in Table 1 and
reiterated below.
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TABLE 1
THE AUTHORITY/INTERPRETATION RELATIONSHIP
FOR THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Authority Theory

Asserted Relationship

Actual Relationship

brute fact, oaths

unspecified

none

good content

suggests moral reading

opposite relationship;
no method suggested

practical authority, CJT

suggests originalism

none applied to t0 decision;
weak theory for t-1 decision

precommitment, incentives

suggests originalism

weak theory

coordination

suggests conventionalism

perhaps, but little constraint

tradition

suggests common law

none, if another law source

unsettlement

indeterminacy guarantee

perhaps, but little constraint

First, positivist efforts to describe law without normative evaluation have no
apparent connection to any method of interpretation. Such brute fact theories cannot
recommend the maintenance of what they define as law, let alone how it ought to be
interpreted. These are, after all, content-independent explanations of what law is and
they should not be expected to provide much guidance on the subtleties of interpretation.
Good content theories do aim for an assessment of the moral quality of law’s
content and they can provide reasons for respecting it. When the law’s content is worse
than perfect and better than awful, however, the advice is not clear. Equally important,
an informed assessment of the Constitution demands some kind of interpretive
presupposition. And this means interpretation is driving authority, not the reverse. The
situation might be different if a prior generation qualified as a practical authority or if the
Condorcet Jury Theorem applied to their judgments. The problem is that these theories
fit poorly with the dated text-making procedures that generated the Constitution.
For similar reasons, contractarian and incentive-based theories could influence
interpretive method if they worked with an ancient constitutional text. But application to
the Constitution is at least controversial. Precommitment requires individuals to
conceptualize themselves as part of a single generation of nation builders. Some will
understandably resist this idea, which bears the risk of undue deference to past mistakes
and has trouble identifying an effective constraint that the same “self” imposes and
obeys.
Content-independent stability theories do present sound reasons for continued if
qualified respect for the status quo. Their conservative message complements good
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content theories by openly analyzing the foreseeable risks of departure. On the other
hand, the implications of stability theories for interpretive method are limited. Even if
they could advise conventional readings of the Constitution, they do not provide a
direction for interpretation. An array of interpretive choices may reduce variance in
meaning without disrupting continued reliance of the document. Adhering to the asserted
authority/interpretation relationship is even more awkward when stability and good
content theories are combined, as they often are.253 The former provides little guidance
for interpretive method, while the latter depends on the method selected on a stillunspecified basis.
A broader lesson recognizes the impact of normative frameworks. Their role in
decisionmaking undercuts the sequential rigidity of any general assertion that authority
drives interpretation. For the assertion to be convincing, values reflected in an
interpretive method and attributed to the dictates of a companion authority theory should
not be, in fact, the result of a third force. But at least for good content and stability
theories, there does seem to be a third force operating. Their possible affiliation with
moral and conventional readings of the Constitution is usefully accounted for with an
overarching normative framework. Certainly one can begin with a generic commitment
such as egalitarianism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, or some other way of conducting
normative evaluation, and then apply that commitment to authority theories as well as
interpretive method.254 At some point the larger normative questions are inescapable.
So it would not be surprising if theorists typically deploy a relatively general
normative framework both when they attempt to justify respect for the Constitution and
when they recommend interpretations of the document. This account fits well with a
commitment to interpret the written Constitution so that it is sufficiently good to deserve
respect,255 or to ordinarily read the text in a conventional fashion so as to preserve its
socially beneficial status as a focal point.256 It is far less apparent what value there is in
charting an analytic sequence in which an authority theory is specified at step one and
then squeezed for interpretive guidance at step two.
Finally, the relationship of authority to interpretation is likely to change over time.
Newly ratified constitutions, newly enacted statutes, newly promulgated regulations, and
newly issued orders from superior officers benefit from a different collection of authority
theories. Dead hand complaints weaken in the absence of substantial population shifts
while social contractarian theories become more plausible. Near the time of enactment or
issuance, the basis for a text’s authority might recommend some kind of originalist
investigation to resolve uncertainty in meaning.257 There are, as I have emphasized, other
253

See supra note 133 (collecting sources).
I am referring to normative authority theories, not brute fact theories. The latter are neither overtly
normative nor do they have implications for interpretive method.
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See supra Part III.B.2.
256
See supra Part III.B.4.
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Accord Brest, supra note 11, at 205 (referring to a form of nonoriginalism in which the presumptive
force of text and history is “defeasible over time in the light of changing experiences and perceptions”);
Micheal C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1820 (1997) (similar); Richard Primus, When To Be an Originalist 35 (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (similar); Strauss, Jefferson’s Principle, supra note 11, at 1752–54 (arguing that it
may be appropriate to start with originalist interpretation but to employ other methods as time passes);
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considerations in designing a sound interpretive method—considerations of feasibility
and institutional role. But the bare logical implication of an authority theory for recent
additions to positive law arguably favors a version of originalism that will respect the
political resolution achieved. Perhaps our Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be
interpreted differently from our First. And perhaps nations with young written
constitutions ought to be originalists, while countries with more constitutional history
should rely less on these texts.
All else equal, recent regime change argues for respecting the resulting political
settlement with a minimum of creativity. Assuming the new regime should not be
divided into separate political communities, attempting to honor original understandings
faithfully can be a technique for building trust and long-term cooperation—and it should
come at a time when originalist interpretation is most feasible. Such fidelity might well
amount to a brute fact of political reality. Of course it may be too difficult to locate a
point at which the logical force of contractarian theories expire, or the proper rate at
which their force diminishes. The basic implication is, however, clear enough.
B. Explanations
But if the authority/interpretation relationship is variable and complex, one might
wonder why simpler and more ambitious assertions about the relationship are heard in
constitutional theory. Three possibilities are worth considering.
First, some theorists actually make limited claims. Raz, who suggests the
combination of good content and stability theories for respecting the Constitution, is an
example. He warns that an authority theory is only one factor in interpretive method and
concludes that, once the competing considerations of stability and innovation are
accounted for, there is little constructive advice for constitutional interpretation “other
than ‘reason well’ or ‘interpret reasonably.’”258 Now, there is a strong case for adding
interpretive rules to these vague directives.259 The more important observation is that
authority scholarship can be nuanced on the interpretation question and the nuance might
be lost to the attraction of plain and bold statements. This might be especially so for
theories of constitutional authority, which are intriguing in their own right.
A second explanation is the readily available analogue of statutory interpretation.
The logical influence of plausible statutory authority theories on methods of statutory
interpretation could be significant.260 Taking the typical situation of a court attempting to
resolve ambiguity in statutory meaning, it is not irrational to recommend that the court
play agent to the legislature’s principal. This might suggest a brand of originalist
statutory interpretation rather than moral or other readings, and this conclusion is
reinforced if the legislature ought to be treated as a practical authority. Again, this advice
for statutory interpretation is contested. One might decide to respect the legislature by
sticking to the statutory language and its supposedly public meaning, for example, rather
than investigating other legislative history; it depends on what kind of respect is most
Strauss, Common Law, supra note 11, at 924 (discussing conventionalism in young nations); cf. Merrill,
supra note 25, at 512 (“Over time, however, the original meaning and the conventional meaning will often
diverge, and when that happens the conventionalist of course follows the conventional meaning . . . .”).
258
Raz, Authority and Interpretation, supra note 10, at 180.
259
See Samaha, Undue Process, supra note 18, at 614–20 (discussing decision costs and error costs).
260
See supra Part II.C.
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appealing. Furthermore, Heidi Hurd reconsidered her authority theory for statutes after
concluding that the intent-oriented interpretive method it suggested was inappropriate or
impossible.261 Of more immediate concern is the problem of direct importation into
federal constitutional law. For many observers it has become difficult to equate ancient
constitutional text with statutes that are younger or at least easier to amend, or to view
past generations like superior officers who issued commands in t-1 that are entitled to
respect at t0.
This second explanation for the asserted authority/interpretation relationship
seems incomplete, however, and not only because many Americans do identify with a
unified national heritage. Moral readers, common-law constitutionalists, and others have
connected interpretive method to an authority theory without accepting a command
model of constitutional law or the collapse of generations into “the American People.”
More is at work than a contested analogy between statutory and constitutional law.
A third explanation returns to concrete controversies: abortion policy, gun
control, and the rest.262 With the Supreme Court situated as an important expositor of
constitutional meaning, critics and admirers sought new leverage in their debates. Legal
scholars were not willing to follow Monaghan and concede the issue of the Constitution’s
legal status to political theorists.263 At some point moral readers and originalists
perceived a connection between the interpretive results to which they were committed
and an authority theory which they could accept. The former could question the
advantages and coherence of dead hand control while advocating the possibility of a
morally satisfying Constitution—if only it were supplemented by an interpretive practice
sensitive to our best rendering of the good. The latter could draw on popular affection for
the founding generation, even if these feelings were not so potent among intellectuals—
and follow this respect from the foundation for the Constitution as law to the
interpretation of that same text. Common law constitutionalists who accepted the text as
worthy of some degree of respect developed their own response to the authority question.
They could solve the dead hand problem without automatic respect for founding era
decisions by tolerating the text as a focal point and one source of wisdom—which gives
the written Constitution a role in our law while confronting the originalists’ asserted
authority/interpretation relationship on its own terms.
Originalists and others might have thought that shifting the conversation to a more
general theoretical plane would help resolve urgent questions in adjudication. If, for
example, nonoriginalists would just admit that the written Constitution must be law and
that the reason for its status must drive interpretive method away from the innovations of
Roe v. Wade, more people might consult the good work of ratification and its surrounding
history. But the debates persisted, replicated at every level from theory to method to
meaning.
It is tempting to end on this note, suggesting that the theoretical assent to
authority was a not particularly fruitful strategic effort to resolve more ideologically
charged controversies. Tempting because partly true. But not all theoretical efforts have
261

See Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, supra note 125, at 405–06, 418–24 (promoting theoretical authority
for statutes, as in heuristic advice on moral conduct, and separating it from intentionalist interpretation).
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See supra Part I.A.
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See supra text accompanying note 86.

Forthcoming in 108 Columbia Law Review
Draft of 12/30/2007

57

this character. And it will be more constructive to close with thoughts, however
provisional, on how the connection between authority theories and interpretive methods
can be reconsidered within a broader frame.
FIGURE 2: RECONFIGURED RELATIONSHIP (DEDUCTIVE VERSION)

NORMATIVE
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INSTITUTIONS
AND FEASIBILITY

AUTHORITY

INTERPRETIVE

OTHER
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(identify law sources
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(specify meaning)
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DECISION
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regulation issued, etc.)

C. Reconfiguration
Neither McConnell’s nor Monaghan’s message is quite correct. Those who see
authority theories as a separate exercise and the key to interpretive method are
overclaiming. Authority theories do identify law and suggest overarching normative
values, but an interpreter may take those values into account regardless and the rest of the
authority/interpretation connection is complicated. Yet those who jettison the authority
inquiry from the proper domain of legal scholarship are losing something. Most
important, authority theories are well placed to gauge the relative strength of competing
sources of law. This can have serious implications for the practice of constitutional
interpretation and decisionmaking. Retaining for convenience the asserted relationship’s
deductive character (recall Figure 1), we can reconfigure a defensible connection between
authority theories, interpretive methods, and other considerations left out by the assertion
(Figure 2).264
264

For those who stress induction or reflective equilibrium, think of Figure 2 turned upside down or
repeatedly flipped. On influence diagrams, of which Figure 2 is a simplified version, see Ross D. Shachter,
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The first analytical advance follows what is becoming conventional wisdom in the
academy: the relevance to interpretation of overarching normative frameworks and
institutional factors.265 The former provide goals for conduct and the latter are reminders
that the particular occasion for interpretation matters. Goals are inevitable, whether highminded or self-centered. Awareness of institutional setting performs complementary
functions. Knowing that the relevant activity is, for instance, judicial adjudication or
agency rulemaking refines the interpreter’s goals. Each institution possesses comparative
advantage on certain tasks but not others. The institutional location shapes appropriate
objectives for interpretation and fixes the relationship of the interpreter to other actors in
a dynamic way. Further, the institutional setting comes with feasibility constraints.
Along with more general limits on what decisionmakers can achieve, the institutional
location grounds methodological choices in reality. Only certain information, resources,
and effects will be imaginable and obtainable.
This interaction of norms with institutions and their associated feasibility
constraints leads to another revision. It is to change the end result from “meaning” to
“decision.” The ultimate objective of the asserted relationship between authority theories
and interpretive method is to yield meaning from sources of law. Of course generating
meaning from law is valuable, but the healthy injection of normative goals and
institutional factors is a signal that this form of interpretation is rarely done for its own
sake.
Legal interpretation produces information for a decision process with
consequences. The process affects participants and its output is an alteration of the status
quo, even if only to confirm widespread expectations. Textual meaning is only one
component of decisions, which are essential to institutions whether they regulate,
legislate, adjudicate, or enforce law.266
With this decision-oriented perspective, authority theories and interpretation can
be reconnected. We already understand they may interact with respect to a single text.
For example, choosing an interpretive method facilitates a normative evaluation of the
Constitution’s content. But placing the activity of interpretation within an institution’s
process for decision exposes another connection—the relative influence of multiple
information sources.
Every decision process selects from an infinite number of information sources
those that seem required or useful. And every decision process develops some protocol
for aggregating or reconciling relevant sources, even if that protocol is implicit.267 In
Model Building with Belief Networks and Influence Diagrams, in Advances in Decision Analysis: From
Foundations to Applications 177 (Ward Edwards et al. eds., 2007).
265
See, e.g., Komesar, supra note 17, at 4–5 (stressing institutional choice as necessary for translating
social goals into policy choices); supra notes 17, 113–114 (collecting sources).
266
See supra notes 112–114 (discussing literary theorist’s concentration on interpretation as search for
authorial intent and lawyer’s struggle to keep the term more flexible); cf. Gary Lawson, On Reading
Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823, 1823–24 (1997) (seeking to segregate the concept of
interpretation and the practice of adjudication).
267
See, e.g., William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Horgarth, Judgment and Decision Research: Some
Historical Context, in Research on Judgment and Decision Making: Currents, Connections, and
Controversies 3, 3–34 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Horgarth eds., 1997) (canvassing developments
in expected utility theory and behavioral psychology); Ronald A. Howard, The Foundations of Decision
Analysis Revisited, in Advances in Decision Analysis, supra note 264, at 32, 34–39 (building a prescriptive
rationalist model for decisions); Irving Tallman & Louis N. Gray, Choices, Decisions, and Problem
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working with multiple sources perceived as discrete, decisionmakers assign relative
strengths to these sources during the process of reconciliation. These relative values
move the decisionmaking process forward. The processes we call adjudication,
legislation, regulation, and enforcement are no different in this respect. Actors within
those institutions have goals and agendas that are resolved by collecting information
which often points toward conflicting outcomes. This data includes case-specific facts
and more general information, historical inquiry and prediction of consequences.
Another piece of information is existing positive law, conventionally divided between
supreme federal constitutional law and lower orders of authority. This distinction is
pedestrian. After all, the written Constitution declares itself “the supreme Law of the
Land” in Article VI, and it has been persistently accepted that the document trumps other
sources in the case of conflict.268
The reality of decisionmaking processes is more complicated, however, or at least
open to a different approach. No document is supreme on its say-so, as the dead hand
complaint reminds us. Asking why the written Constitution is allowed to have force
today can lead to a conclusion short of wholehearted endorsement yet more respectful
than complete rejection.269 The Constitution’s authority, its legitimacy, and anyone’s
obligation to respect it can be variables with multiple gradations. A time can be imagined
when the brute forces of social acceptance wane without disappearing. Contractarian and
Condorcetian theories have already weakened with time, the goodness of the text varies
with one’s normative framework in addition to interpretive method, and stability
arguments are only one consideration in the decision to abide. Concluding that the
written Constitution is weakly authoritative, in the sense that there should be serious
doubt about the propriety of enforcing it to the hilt, is entirely plausible depending on
one’s normative values. If the document’s authority may be judged with a scale instead
of a switch, then its justifiable strength as a source of law need not match the bravado of
Article VI.
Assigning the written Constitution something less than its declared strength might
have extremely troubling consequences, at least if done transparently, and doing so less
publicly is fraught with other moral risks. But before the thought is rejected, we should
understand that softening the Constitution’s potency as a source of law can have at least
two effects.
The first effect might be to multiply the sources of supreme constitutional law.
Many academics believe such additional sources already exist—for example, judicial

Solving, 16 Ann. Rev. Soc. 405, 425–27 (1990) (discussing spontaneous and deliberative choice and links
to social setting); see also Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 141–43 (3d ed. 2000) (describing
problematic availability heuristics); Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, supra note 17, at 175–81
(reviewing decision strategies for uncertainty, such as maximin, satisficing, and heuristics).
268
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
269
Richard Fallon helpfully identifies gradations in sociological legitimacy and accepts this possibility for
moral legitimacy, but he questions the value of moral legitimacy theories intermediate between minimal
and ideal. See Fallon, supra note 96, at 1796, 1798–99 & n.36. He also concludes that it would conflate
empirical and normative matters to combine his notions of legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy. See
id. at 1851.
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decisions denominated constitutional and arrived at through common law reasoning.270
Others have made sustained efforts to expand our operative canon of constitutional law—
for example, Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional moments.271 There is also an analogy to
theories that soften the distinction between the Constitution and favored statutes.272 It is
likewise possible to view recent discussion about the proper role of foreign law in U.S.
Constitutional adjudication as an extension of the effort to add sources. Although the
argument for foreign sources may be couched as a supplement to interpretation of
domestic constitutional text,273 these sources might be used as evidence of a universal
normative truth. And, as I have indicated, the line between a new source of constitutional
law and a resource for interpretation is easy to cross anyway.274
Each of these candidates for supreme or fundamental law might be unacceptable
or frightening, especially if arbitrated through supreme judicial review. But these fears
might be grounds to maintain the supreme strength of the written Constitution rather than
to deny the possible consequences of moderating that strength. The consequences are
perhaps the best reasons for matching the Constitution’s cultural status with a supreme
legal status, even if no concrete interpretive method for the document will follow.
The second possible effect is quite different. It involves the relative strength of
supposedly lower order domestic law. Strength can matter even if the Constitution is the
sole candidate for supreme law. If that text is weakly authoritative, then admittedly
nonsupreme sources of law could receive correspondingly greater influence in
decisionmaking. The occasions on which interpreted constitutional text trumps other
sources of law would be reduced or eliminated. Contrast the first effect of moderating
the Constitution’s strength, which raises qualms about too many sources of constitutional
law overriding the work of present-day officials. Here the entire notion of a supreme law
is eroding. Other sources of supposedly ordinary legal authority—federal statutes,
regulations, executive decisions—presumably rise in relative importance.
The result is akin to Thayer’s hope for judicial deference to the judgments of

270

See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1127–28 (1987)
(making originalist argument favoring “multiple sources of fundamental law”); supra note 109 (collecting
sources);.
271
See supra notes 47, 111; cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 965 (1998) (concentrating on academia).
272
See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 9, at 1781–82, 1806–07 (reviewing race-based civil
rights legislation and emphasizing role of lawyers in defending these past victories); William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1216, 1275–76 (2001) (discussing statutes that
“over time . . . ‘stick’ in the public culture such that . . . the super-statute and its institutional or normative
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Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53
UCLA L. Rev. 909, 913–16, 956–76 (2006) (using nonjudicial platforms to enable information access
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273
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See supra Parts II.A–B.
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other decisionmakers when constitutional concerns arise.275 But it is conceptually more
radical. Diminished in strength, the Constitution would have less legitimate hold on
nonjudicial actors who otherwise would have retained an obligation to make their own
inquiry into constitutional meaning. Constitutional judicial review would subside in
overt form, but so would review by any other institution.
The net practical effect need not be severe, however. A combination of authority
theories might nudge the written Constitution above some other sources in strength. And
even if that result cannot be achieved, path dependence, the inertia of legal culture, and
contemporary judgments in the face of uncertainty might leave the document and even
judicial influence fairly secure. Recall the history of vacillation between bicameral and
unicameral legislative forms in places where formal constitutional amendment is easier:
there is none.276
No doubt these potential effects are unacceptable to many, and I am not endorsing
either. Adding the dimension of strength to the authority question is meant to establish a
practical connection between authority theories and constitutional interpretation within a
decision context, a connection more revealing than the asserted unidirectional
relationship from authority to interpretation for particular sources. In some ways the
connection is unfortunate. It brings with it the possibility of inserting the deep question
of the written Constitution’s authoritative strength into the workaday job of
interpretation. The issue, moreover, is not one for which the conventional lawyer enjoys
a clear advantage in knowledge or judgment. But it appears that a sound analytical
picture of interpretation and decision is incomplete without this relationship to the
authority inquiry. Who ought to conduct the inquiry is another question.
CONCLUSION
For us and for now, the written Constitution is an invincible icon and enforceable
law. But the relationship between theories for its authority and methods of its
interpretation is not yet understood. Many scholars have asserted that the former
importantly influences the latter, in the sense that particular authority theories are
logically linked to particular interpretive methods. The truth is complicated. In some
instances the arrow of influence runs from interpretive method back to an authority
theory. In others there is no strong influence in any direction. In still others an authority
theory ought to influence interpretive method but the theory itself is implausible or at
least controversial.
A more useful picture of the authority/interpretation connection makes decision
the central concern, and it understands the interpretation of law as simply one source of
information. “Meaning” is not the ultimate goal. From this perspective, the practice of
interpretation can be reconnected to authority theories. Authority theories identify targets
for interpretation for legal decisionmakers, they may reflect overarching normative
values that independently influence interpretation, and they can graduate the strength of
competing sources of law in a way that affects decisions in institutions. This last
influence might be problematic for conventional lawyers and judges. But for a rigorous
275
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analysis of constitutional interpretation and decision, a contested question of authority
seems unavoidable: To what extent should people restrict their judgment about law in
accord with the imperfect decisions of the past, when the past no longer governs?
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170. Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Unitary Formulary
Apportionment (April 2007)
171. Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (July
2007)
172. Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions (July 2007)
173. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns (July 2007)
174. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination (July 2007)
175. Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela
Gross, Yoram Margalioth and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective
Incapacitation, Governmentality, and Race (July 2007)
176. Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States
(August 2007)
177. Eric A. Posner an Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (August 2007)
178. Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle (August 2007)
179. William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Causation in Tort: General Populations vs.
Individual Cases (August 2007)
180. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts (August 2007)
181. Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (September
2007)
182. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability,
and Automatic Injunctions” (September 2007)
183. Robin Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination: Lessons from September
11th Litigation (October 2007)
184. Richard H. McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of hte Law: Two
Contextualized Tests (October 2007)
185. Richard H. McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. Hollingsworth
(October 2007)
186. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent
(October 2007)
187. Jonathan R. Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure
and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review (October 2007)
188. Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review
(November 2007)
189. Richard H. McAdams, The Economic Costs of Inequality (November 2007)
190. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information (November 2007)
191. Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism (December 2007)
192. Jonathan Nash, Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in
Road Traffic Management (December 2007)
193. Edward L. Glaeser and Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning (December 2007)
194. Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation (January 2008)

Forthcoming in 108 Columbia Law Review
Draft of 12/30/2007

3

